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This thesis examines the role of the American public debate in shaping 
U.S. foreign policy in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The debate over 
intervention in the current Balkan war evolved between 1991-1993, from 
concerns over struggling democracies into those of humanitarian obligations. 
The study begins with an illustration of the complexities of the current war, 
with a look at history, politics and personalities. The study then examines the 
actors who have participated in the public debate over U.S. policy in the 
Balkans.  Focusing on the Bosnian phase of the war, the Bush and Clinton 
administrations are examined for their roles in contributing to the resolution 
of the war and the humanitarian effort. The roles of the media, Congress, the 
world community, the Executive Branch of U.S. government, and the 
President of the U.S, are examined closely for their impact on shaping U.S. 
actions through public debate. In summary, the study concludes that because 
U.S. foreign policy is directly influenced by the American public debate, the 
timeliness of the evolution of the debate plays a critical role in cases of foreign 
intervention in regional and ethno-national conflicts. 
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This study examines the evolution of public debate over the current 
war in the former Yugoslavia. It begins with a discussion of the complexities 
of Balkan history as it relates to the current conflict. The historic events and 
periods which are addressed include: the Battle of Kosova and Ottoman 
domination; the "Eastern Question" of the nineteenth century; the creation of 
Yugoslavia; World War II and the Civil War; and the Tito era.  The overview 
of Balkan history is discussed in order to set the stage for the motivation for 
public debate. 
The study concentrates on the five principle actors involved in the 
public debate. They are grouped as: 
- public opinion and the media 
-the world community 
-Congress 
-the Executive branch of government 
-the President 
These actors were grouped in this manner to provide a systematic approach of 
research through mainstream periodical literature, major U.S. newspapers, 
Gallup opinion polls, Congressional records, U.S. Department of State 
Dispatches, and Presidential speeches. 
The study provides information on how the actors involved in public 
debate reacted to events in the war in the former Yugoslavia, and how those 
reaction affected U.S. foreign policy decisions. The graphs provided in the 
appendices are presented to offer a visual illustration of the major issues 
discussed by the actors, which include: 
-the concern for struggling new democracies in Yugoslavia 
XI 
-the issue of humanitarian aid 
-the issue of "ancient hatreds" as the cause for conflict in the Balkans 
-the "ethnic cleansing" campaign and genocide 
-the debate over intervention versus non-intervention 
The issues are discussed and examined to determine the dynamic nature of 
the public debate and the changes in focus of interest between 1991 and 1993. 
The empirical research of the specific arguments made during the 
public debate reveal a distinct change in attitude after the news article 
concerning Nazi-style concentration camps and ethnic cleansing was written 
by Roy Gutman in August 1992. The public debate put aside arguments about 
"ancient hatreds" and struggling democracies and concentrated on the 
humanitarian issue after knowledge of the "ethnic cleansing" campaign 
became worldwide. 
The public debate over critical foreign policy issues plays a major role 
in the decision-making process of the U.S. government.  An assessment of 
U.S. participation in resolving the Yugoslav war may contribute to U.S. 
foreign policy decisions in the future. 
The debate over intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina evolved over 
time and played a significant role in influencing limited U.S. humanitarian 
intervention. 
The potential for conflict similar to the one which has consumed the 
former Yugoslavia, is ever present in the dynamic environment of the post- 
Cold War world. The ideological struggle in the bi-polar situation of the Cold 
War no longer drives U.S. foreign interests.  Because of this, the U.S. is 
hesitant to intervene in situations before weighing national interests and 
domestic approval.  However, as champions of democracy and human rights, 
humanitarian tragedies such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti has lead 
Xll 
the public debate towards the support of limited military and diplomatic 
intervention overseas.  The study of the current war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
provides insight on the changing role of the U.S. in regional and ethnic 
disputes in future conflicts across the globe. 
Xlll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The destruction of Yugoslavia is a warning that the post-Cold War 
world is still threatened by war. The end of the Cold War and the demise of 
the Soviet Union gave Americans a sudden sense of security—albeit a false 
one. But the celebration ended as suddenly as it had begun and the leaders of 
the United States (U.S.) had to decide what role their government would 
assume in the face of conflict. According to President George Bush in his 1991 
State of the Union address, the U.S. would "continue to lead in support of 
freedom everywhere—not out of arrogance, and not out of altruism, but for 
the safety and security of our children."1 
However, several factors are inherently involved in shaping U.S. 
foreign policy decisions.  One of the major influences on American foreign 
policy is public debate over controversial issues. This thesis will examine the 
evolution and nature of the public debate over the war in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
The reality of the brave "new world order"~of which President Bush 
spoke of during his State of the Union Address- quickly forced the U.S. to 
reassess its responsibility as the only remaining superpower when conflict 
arose in the former Yugoslavia.  Cold War diplomatic and military doctrines 
had to be redesigned to match the requirements of the changing world. The 
neatly packaged foreign policy doctrine articulated in National Security 
Council (NSC) 68,2 would no longer suffice in the new multi-polar world 
*For full transcript of President Bush's "State of the Union Address," see Congressional Records, 
January 1991. 
2The first comprehensive statement of a national strategy was published as NSC 68 by the U.S. 
State Department. Paul Nitze served as primary author and editor of this document, which 
containing such diverse conflicts as those in Eastern Europe and Africa. This 
"new world order" called for new foreign policy doctrines, yet none emerged. 
Although the Cold War ended suddenly, the western powers did not 
plan for the numerous and diverse situations that lay ahead.  There were no 
international conferences or treaties to announce the ground rules for a new 
order as there had been in every major international juncture in the past: 
World War I had the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly, Trianon, 
and Sevres; World War II had the Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, Potsdam 
and Paris Conferences which gave birth to the United Nations (UN) and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The post-Cold War world faces 
new frontiers without the aid of conferences or treaties. 
The world is without order and the struggling new democratic states of 
Eastern Europe are disillusioned by unmet hopes to become westernized and 
welcomed into the European Community of prosperous nations.   Without 
the support and guidance of established western democracies, the fate of these 
desperate states is left to a handful of leftover communists aspiring to control 
economically devastated and poorly managed countries. In the case of 
Yugoslavia, the most extreme fears of potential crisis became reality. 
U.S. national interests must be articulated before foreign policy can be 
decided. However, these specific interests have yet to be established since the 
demise of the Soviet Union.   By examining the evolution of the public debate 
over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a better understanding of what those 
interests should focus upon in the future emerges.  The definitions of 
American national interests in the former Yugoslavia have been the focus of 
guided U.S. foreign policy throughout the entire Cold War. For more details, see Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Common Defense. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) 47-53. 
major public debates for the past three years and will be discussed in this 
thesis. 
Because this thesis focuses on the U.S. public debate over the war in the 
former Yugoslavia, the chapter on history is not elaborate or comprehensive. 
It serves only to provide a brief description of the geopolitical and nationalist 
aspects of Yugoslavia which have remained constant throughout the ages. 
The Balkans have played a significant role in shaping modern European 
history since the nineteenth century. The potential for a greater European 
conflict is therefore, not so far fetched when one reviews the history of 
political conflict and war in this region. Furthermore, this history is 
significant in understanding how events and personalities-which have 
propelled Yugoslavia into a three year war-have been misinterpreted and 
misjudged in the public debate. 
Although U.S. foreign policy is created within the Executive Branch of 
government, the American public increasingly influences policy.  Chapter in 
examines the key players in the American public debate over the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Based upon an analysis of:  mainstream news articles, The New York 
Times editorials, and Congressional statements and hearings, the public 
debate over the crisis in the former Yugoslavia did not emerged until the war 
spread to Bosnia-Herzegovian.3 Therefore, this thesis focuses on the period 
after war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 and on the reactions and 
actions within the Bush and Clinton administrations.   However, Chapter 
3This analysis was based on a comprehensive review of all mainstream news articles compiled 
in The Readers Guide to Periodicals. Congressional Hearings, and The New York Times. 
between 1990 and 1994. See graphic presentation of the public debate on the former Yugoslavia 
in Appendix A. 
four provides a brief description of the events in Croatia and Slovenia, which 
sets the stage for the Bosnian phase of the war, as discussed in Chapter V. 
One of the major issues in the public debate over Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is the "ethnic cleansing" campaign launched upon the Bosnian Muslim 
population. When the world discovered the depth of violence occurring in 
the former Yugoslavia, American public debate increased dramatically. 
Chapter VI describes how this violent campaign was revealed to the 
American public and examines the way in which the government reacted and 
how public debate developed over the issue of U.S. intervention as a result of 
these findings. 
Chapter VII begins and ends with an examination of the evolution of 
foreign policy in the Clinton administration and how public debate evolved 
between 1993 and 1994. It touches briefly on the major events which occurred 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and examines more closely the way in which all the 
actors affected one another in the American public debate. 
In a sense, the U.S. must start fresh in designing a new foreign policy 
doctrine for the post-Cold War world. In order to design a new foreign policy 
doctrine, U.S. national interests and its leadership roles in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the United Nations must also be redefined within 
the realm of the changing world. 
In addition to identifying national interests, the threat to these interests 
must also be identifed.  The U.S. fought the Cold War in order to champion 
democracy and human rights.  Will the U.S. remain the champion of 
democracy and human rights? Will Americans be lead by their emotions and 
moral obligations to police the world?  The NSC  68 document served the 
U.S. well throughout the Cold War. However, its usefullness ended when the 
bi-polar world dissolved. The questions that must be addressed are: 1) Have 
U.S. national interests in Eastern Europe have changed? and 2) Is the U.S. 
prepared or willing to fill the security vacuum left by the former Soviet 
Union? 
Piecemeal attempts by the U.S. to participate in the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, indicates that global interests have waned since the Cold 
War, but are still being debated. These interests have been the focus of public 
debate over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the past three years and are 
discussed in this thesis. This examination may present a clearer picture of 
what post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy must focus on in the future. 
Many new dangers have replaced the looming hegemonic control of 
the former Soviet Union. New battle cries of socialism and neo-facsism have 
emerged from the left-over leaders of the old communist regimes in many of 
the former Soviet satellites and republics. This danger was realized by 1991 
when Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, invaded Croatia and Slovenia 
and began the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II (WWII). 
In 1990, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia held free elections for the first 
time in thirty-eight years. The following year, the newly elected democratic 
government chose to secede from a predominately communist—renamed 
socialist—regime of Slobodan Miliosevic. Prompted by their fear of President 
Milosevic's intentions to create a Greater Serbia within Yugoslavia, Croatia 
and Slovenia chose independence.  As recognized independent, democratic 
states they were attacked by a communist aggressor who threatened to alter 
their borders and expel or exterminate their people. The Western nations 
fought the Cold War precisely to abolish this belligerent behavior.  The 
American public debate hardly mentions Milosevic and his socialist desires 
for a Greater Serbia. However, this was arguably the driving force behind the 
war, not "ethnic tensions" or "ancient hatreds," which are discussed in 
Chapter H 
The destruction of Yugoslavia has been argued by many as a direct 
consequence of the ethnic tensions between Serbs, Muslims and Croats which 
go as far back as the fourteenth century. Many government officials- 
including President Bush-used this argument to justify non-intervention.4 
Although this thesis does not focus on the origins of this complex war, 
it is important to address the important events in Balkan history.  In order to 
introduce the nature of public debate over the current war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, history must be analyzed for its significance in shaping 
American attitudes and reactions towards the events between 1991 and 1994. 
The misinterpretation of history and the selective exploitation of it in the 
current Balkan war is precisely what exacerbated the tragedy which unfolded 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following chapter provides a brief and objective 
account of Balkan history as it relates to the current situation. 
4See President Bush's remarks at news conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado, August 6,1992. 
For full transcript see U.S. Department of State Dispatch, (August 10,1992) v.3, p.617. 
II. HISTORIC BACKGROUND 
You take my life 
when you do take the means whereby I live.5 
Dispute over territorial claims in the Balkans has been reapeated 
throughout history.  The "ancient hatreds" theory, used to explain the current 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is discussed in this chapter. The Ottoman, 
Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires fought for control over the land of 
the South Slavs from medieval times to the twentieth century. 
Simultaneously, the indigenous people, comprised of Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosnians, fought for autonomy within their land.  The numerous uprisings 
by Serbs and Croatians usually won the sympathies of either Russia (for the 
Orthodox ), Austria (for the Roman Catholics,) or the Turks (for the 
Muslims)—which brought the Balkans into the central focus of Great Power 
rivalries.  During the nineteenth century, this became known as the "Eastern 
Question." The current conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is also a matter of 
territorial rights and ethnic domination, this time between the Serbs and 
Bosnian Muslims—both claiming historic ties to the land. 
The struggle over power and territory in the Balkans involves many 
actors. The historic continuities of ethnic rivalry and Great Power 
competition in this region can be easily drawn from the middle ages to the 
present. However, there are far too many actors, with changing roles and 
ideologies, to make the continuity entirely fluid.6 The current war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina is a clear example of historic discontinuity. Although the war 
has become fiercely divided into distinct ethnic groups, the actors within 
^William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice. Act IV, Scene I. 
6For an excellent study on ethnicity and religion in Bosnia, see Ivo Andric, The Bridge on the 
Drina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, translated in 1959). 
these groups identify with several different periods of history and events. 
Some have rallied around the "Battle of Kosovo" in 1348, while others were 
obsessed with the events of WWII and the Civil War.  And still, there are 
those who are only concerned with what has occurred in their lifetimes and 
identify with the peaceful coexistence of religions during the past forty years. 
Public debate over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could not possibly 
take in all of the intricacies involved in Balkan history.  However, the 
"ancient hatreds" theory was a major factor in the U.S. public debate when 
the need arose to justify U.S. non-intervention.  Those in the public debate 
who have argued against intervention, frequently brought up the "ancient 
hatreds" or "ethno-nationalism" theory.   The use of complex historic 
rivalries was used to dissuade the U.S. from becoming involved in a 
protracted conflict between historic enemies.   Interventionists, on the other 
hand, tended to refute dismiss these theories and concentrated on the 
humanitarian aspect of the war-especially as the atrocities began to 
surmount. 
The fact that there are three separate ethno-religious groups who have 
been living within a communist-controlled federation for the past forty-five 
years, complicates matters even further.  To make matters even more 
confusing, each ethnic group is composed of several regional and local 
groups, speaking and reading different dialects of the Serbo-Croatian 
language, and living side by side with one another. It is because of this 
complicated web of mixed sociologic groupings, that makes it impossible to 
blame the origins of the current war on an ethnic dispute between two 
distinct factions.   But, the notion that "ethno-nationalism" and "ancient 
hatreds" was the direct cause of the current war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was 
easily accepted by many as a post-Cold war phenomenon-suppressed for years 
by communism and suddenly unleashed. 
It is for the reasons presented in the above discussion that public debate 
over the current war in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be analyzed within the 
context of Balkan history. Suppressed ancient hatreds were not the cause of 
the current war, however they were indeed, used to inspire the barbaric side 
of human beings to levels of inhumanity unimaginable to the average 
person. Both the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims are now entangled in deep- 
rooted hatreds which, only five years ago had little to do with everyday life in 
Yugoslavia. The carnage committed over the past two years, however, has 
added to the collective pain and histories of the South Slav peoples, which 
will take yet another generation to heal. 
American public debate over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina dragged 
history into the arguments without really understanding the political and 
sociological backgrounds of the Balkan people.  The following discussion 
provides a brief background of the Yugoslavs or, literally translated, "South 
Slavs." 
A. THE "ANCIENT HATREDS" THEORY 
President Slobodan Milosevic, of Serbia frequently made references to 
the Battle of Kosovo, which took place over six hundred years ago, in order to 
inspire vengeance against the Turks (or Muslims) for centuries of Ottoman 
domination.  General Ratko Mladic, son of a Cetnik soldier and leader of the 
Serbian Army, identifies himself with the Cetniks from WWII and the Civil 
War and rallies his troops around Cetnik war cries, colors, symbols, and 
songs.7 These Serbian leaders have exploited different historic events for 
their own political and personal gain.  The exploitation was made easy, 
however, due to the powerful political forces of pain and tragedy throughout 
Balkan history--not to mention the forces of a communist dictator. 
The "ancient hatreds" theory is much more complicated than most 
would assume.  War in Europe and Asia was hardly uncommon throughout 
history. Most every country in Europe and Asia fought one another at some 
point in history.   So, why does hatred in the Balkans run so much deeper 
than that of the French and the Germans? Furthermore, the Serbs, Croatians 
and Muslims have been living under the name Yugoslavia for over eighty 
years. These questions were not proposed by those who used the "ancient 
hatreds" theory to explain the current war. 
1. The South Slavs 
The Balkan peninsula was once the homeland of the Greek empire 
before the sixth century A.D. and included Hellenes, Macedonians, Thracians 
and Illyrians.  During the sixth century, a huge migration from what is 
known today as the Ukraine and Russia brought several Slavic tribes escaping 
from the swampy lands and violent invasions of that region. The craggy 
mountain ranges, forests, rivers, and fertile valleys of the Balkan peninsula 
were their places of settlement.  They did, however, encounter opposition 
from the dying Greek nations and Byzantine commanders of imperial 
frontier garrisons.  But, they arrived by the thousands throughout the sixth 
and seventh centuries, despite the opposition.  Once they were settled, the 
Slavs dispersed into numerous tribal elements throughout the Balkan 
7David Binder, "Pariah as Patriot:  Ratko Mladic," The New York Times Magazine, 
(September 44,1994) 26-29. 
10 
mountains and hills, sometimes never seeing another tribe for decades at a 
time.8 
Because of the tribal nature of the Balkan Slavs and their dispersion 
into the mountains, there was no overarching leadership or Slavic unity for 
centuries after their arrival.   The Byzantines and Romans spread Catholicism 
and Orthodoxy throughout the Balkans, which took firm and lasting root and 
provided religious leadership. However, the heretic practice of Bogomilism9- 
- a form of dualism which rejected authority-- was presented in the tenth 
century by the King of Serbia and remained popular throughout the middle 
ages. The separate tribal and religious groups were led by chieftains and 
organized into larger combinations as the middle ages progressed. By the 
eleventh century, there were basically two large divisions—the Serbs and the 
Croats. This was followed by the formation of the countries of Serbia and 
Croatia, led by respective princes. Bosnia was situated between these two 
countries and inhabited by a mixture of Serbian and Croatian Slavs.10 
In order to distinguish a border between Serbia and Croatia, the Roman 
and Byzantine statesmen collaborated and made the Drina river the boundary 
between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Being Orthodox was the equivalent of 
being Serbian, therefore, Catholics were considered Croats. However, this 
demarcation left many Catholics on the Serbian side of the border and many 
Orthodox on the Croat side. This was cause for much confusion and tension 
8Louis Adamic, My Native Land .(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943) 206-207. 
9Bogomilism (from the name of a Slav priest called 'Bogomil', the Slavonic form of the Greek 
name Theophilos) was similar to, and influenced by, the Massalian and Paulician heresies 
which flourished in Asia Minor. The Bogomils rejected all outward forms of ecclesiastical 
organisation and religious rituals as being expressions of the powers of evil. See Muriel 
Heppell and Frank B. Singleton, Yugoslavia. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961) 47-48, for 
more on Bogomilism. 
10Adamic, 209. 
11 
which has lasted to the present day.11 In Bosnia, the original Slavs claimed 
neither to be Croatian nor Serbian. However, as soon as their religions took 
root, they were labeled as Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats. 
The Serbs were under the influence and control of the Byzantine 
empire until the early thirteenth century.  They formed independent states 
with native Bangs. In 1219, they were granted an independent Archbishopric, 
which was later raised to a Patriarchate. The national church organization 
acted as the driving force and bond for Serbian ethnic consciousness after they 
lost their independence to the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century.12 
2. The Ottoman Empire 
The Ottoman Empire ruled over the Balkans for over five hundred 
years.   Over twenty million inhabitants of numerous diverse nationalities of 
both the Islamic and Christian faith lived within this empire.  The Turkish 
military was a powerful organization which allowed for the repressive 
control of a vast area that reached from the Habsburg lands to the Venetian 
possessions. 
To this day, June twenty-eighth is honored in Serbia to commemorate 
the day the Serbian army was defeated by the invasion of the Turks in 1389 at 
the Battle of Kosovo.  It is now called "Vivovdan" and Serbian National Day. 
The Ottoman Turks forcibly brought the Muslim faith into Bosnia when they 
invaded.  All Slavs who refused to convert to Islam were repressed and forced 
into a barbaric form of Turkish feudalism.  This was the origin of recently 
exploited propaganda used to create animosity by the ultra-nationalist Serbian 
11Ibid, 211-210. 
12Robert F. Byrnes, ed. East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Yugoslavia, (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1957) 4. 
12 
aggressors towards the Muslims in the war in Bosnia today. In fact, the name 
"Turk" is often heard today in Serbia as a derogatory term for "Muslims".13 
In his essay titled "The Clash of Civilizations," Samuel P. Huntington 
proposed that the existence of "fault lines between Western Christianity, 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam was made in the year 1500." It begins as far 
north as Finland- separating it from Russia- and cuts south dividing Croatia 
and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. He stated that this line coincided 
with the separation between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires.14 There are 
those who have used this argument in public debate to simplify the current 
Balkan war as the continuation of an ancient feud along an established 
religious fault line.15 A closer analysis of history illustrates the depth and 
complexity of the South Slavs, which serves to discount this theory. 
3. The Demise of the Ottoman Empire 
Turkish rule lasted through the nineteenth century The Ottoman 
empire—the "sick man of Europe'-gradually lost its powerful grip in the 
Balkans.  Numerous peasant revolts occurred throughout the nineteenth 
century and climaxed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  An insurrection began in 
August 1875, against Turkish rule in the predominantly Christian provinces 
in the southern Balkans.  The national self-consciousness of the Serbs living 
there was encouraged by Serbian and Russian propaganda. The Serbs 
introduced their desires for an expanded, Greater Serbia. The violence and 
demonstrations spread rapidly to other Turkish portions of the Balkans. 
Russia became involved in the war to help their brother Serbs, and more 
13Aleksa Djilas, "The Nation That Wasn't," The New Republic, (September 21, 1992): 26. 
14Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs,72 (Summer 1993):   30. 
15See Congressional Records on October 4,1993 for discussion of opponents to intervention and 
the use of historic analyses of ancient hatreds and civil war in the Balkans. 
13 
importantly, to obtain access to the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas. The 
Pan-Slavism movement in Russia encouraged the Serbian revolts and drew 
Russia into the battle.16 This launched the Russo-Turkish war, which drew 
the attention of the great powers in Europe-all of whom had keen interests 
in the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan peninsula was the focal point 
of the balance of power system which lasted most of the nineteenth century 
in Europe. 
In 1878, Russia managed to defeat the Turks and the peace of San 
Stefano was negotiated. This was followed by the Congress of Berlin in 1881, 
which managed to accomplish several things:    1) The Austro-Hungarian 
empire received control over Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2) Serbia's plans to 
acquire large territory for a Greater Serbia was foiled; 3) Sovereignty was 
granted to Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; 4) Bulgaria became an 
autonomous principality; 5) Turkey lost half of its empire; and 6) Russia was 
left with very little.17 
4. The Habsburg Empire 
The Habsburg rulers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire controlled 
Bosnia-Herzegovina until 1914.   The Slavs in Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted 
of both Serbs and Croatians. some of which happened to be of the Muslim 
religion. The subjugation of the Ottoman Turks was, by far, more oppressive 
than the Habsburgs', however, it was subjugation nonetheless. 
16Several scholarly works have argued that Russia was also fighting for a land access through 
the Balkans to obtain rights to the Straits and Dardanelles.  For further details see, George F. 
Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), and Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974). 
17Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, Alt. ed. (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1974) 
187. 
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The Habsburgs controlled its territories by keeping a firm grip on 
nationalist tendencies.  This prevented Bosnia from joining either Serbia or 
Croatia-despite the efforts of both sides to gain influence. They also 
promoted the Bosnian nationality among the three ethno-religious groups — 
the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims —so that 
none could gain power or influence. Finally, a police state was set up in 
Bosnia in the late nineteenth century to prevent influences from either 
Croatia or Serbia. The Slavic people in Bosnia were, therefore, distinguished 
only by their religion.18 
The Bosnians, weary of centuries of subjugation, revolted on several 
occasions. The two Balkan wars were fought between 1912 and 1914, but 
accomplished little in releasing the Austrian yoke.  The so-called "Balkan 
powder keg" exploded, however, on the celebration of "Vidovdan" in 1914 
when a Bosnian Serb youth named Princip shot the Austrian Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, launching World War I (WWI). Princip belonged to a large 
youth and underground organization—the Young Bosnia society— fighting for 
Bosnia's independence.19 
5. The Kingdom of the Serbs 
In December 1918, the Declaration of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes was announced.  The date of the promulgation of the constitution 
was referred to as, "Vidovdan" —the Serbian National Day— which came 
exactly four years after the death of King Ferdinand. 
18Phyllis Autry, Yugoslavia. (New York: Walker and Company, 1965) 49-50. 
19Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic,   History of Yugoslavia. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974, originally published in Serbo-Croatian by 
Prosveta, Belgrade, 1972) 467-468. 
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The constituent assembly of 1920 was represented by fifty-eight 
Communists, fifty Croat Peasants, twenty-seven Slovene Populists, ten Social 
democrats and 264 Serb Centralists.  The non-Serbs withdrew from the 
deliberations due to their irreconcilable differences with the pan-Serb 
majority. In essence, the precani20 of the former Austro-Hungarian 
provinces and the depressed non-Slav minorities did not have a say in the 
government of the country.  The predominance of Serbs in Yugoslav 
government was a theme echoed throughout the next seventy years. 
6. The Yugoslav Idea 
In 1929, King Alexander assumed responsibility for governing the three 
kingdoms making up the land of the South Slavs.  One of the first official acts 
of King Alexander was to combine and change the name of his kingdom to 
Yugoslavia, which is the Serbo-Croatian translation of South Slavs.  Despite 
this all-encompassing name, the new government was still dominated by 
Serbs. 
There were a few Croats who cooperated with the government, but 
were looked on by their fellow countrymen as traitors. Many Croats fled to 
Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria to enlist the support of foreign powers in favor 
of Croat independence. The Croat Peasant Party even approached The League 
of Nations in Geneva for help.  However, nothing substantial came of their 
grievances.21 Serbian dominance in Yugoslav government and the royal 
20precanj js a Serbian word, literally meaning people from "the other side"-of the Danube and 
the Sava rivers. Used to refer to the Slavs living in the former Austro-Hungarian provinces. 
See Heppell, 150. 
21Heppell and Singleton, 157-158. 
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dictatorship lasted until Alexander's assassination by an extremist from the 
Croatian Ustashe organization in 1934.22 
Although the Yugoslav peoples emerged from WWI united under a 
Slavic ruler, a collective image of Yugoslavia was lacking. 
B. WORLD WAR II AND THE CIVIL WAR 
Countries, like individuals, usually cut an image of some 
kind.  Out of thousands of elements certain general 
characteristics or specific styles of life become associated with 
one country or another in a way that commands instant 
recognition...The image of Yugoslavia is blurred, hazy or 
nebulous...23 
This description of Yugoslavia has not changed since its creation. One 
of the few elements that can be associated with the Yugoslavs is their Serbo- 
Croatian language.24 But even this was altered through the ages with various 
dialects and indigenous vernaculars throughout the regions.  Another 
commonalty is the shared history of suffering and subjugation. A legacy of 
imperial wars, invasions, and colonial rule have left the Balkans with a 
landscape of Gothic spires, Islamic mosques and Byzantine domes.25 
Therefore, the world's image of Yugoslavia is actually one of coexistence 
between several different cultures. 
The three major cultures in Yugoslavia came to a clash during WWII. 
When Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany the people were split into 
various ethnic and ideological camps. The remnants of the Royal Army fled 
to the hills of Ravna and Gora in Serbia. They took on the name Cetnik for 
^Milton Viorst, "On Yugoslavia," The New Yorker. (March 18,1991): 67. 
^Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs. (New York: Random House, 1978) 18. 
24Although Slovenia has their own language, five of the six regions speak Serbo-Croatian. 
^Doder, 18. 
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their group, which is a word borrowed from the nineteenth-century Serbian 
irregulars who fought against the Turks. The Cetniks were also a 
combination of the veteran's legion and Serbian Territorial Army, led by the 
Vojvoda Kosta Pecanac.  They were predominantly of Serbian ethnicity.26 
The communist-led Partisans led the strongest of the resistance 
movements and also used the mountainous terrain of Yugoslavia for their 
bastions from the Nazis. The partisans were trained in guerrilla warfare, 
which proved far superior to the tactics used by their Cetnik rivals. 
Leadership was also strong among the partisans. Josip Broz Tito was their 
dynamic leader who demonstrated a genuine devotion to the ideology of the 
socialist movement and to the Soviet Union.27 
The Partisans' agenda differed greatly from that of the Cetniks. Tito 
and his associates were veteran Communists trying to deflect Axis troops 
from the Soviet front and eventually create a Communist regime in 
Yugoslavia after the war. The differences in causes led to differences in tactics 
as well. The Cetniks' operations aggravated the Nazis which led to the 
merciless killing of helpless civilians.  Realizing this, the Cetniks limited 
their operations to prepare for the day when a large uprising could be carried 
out in conjunction with an Allied invasion.  They were also convinced that 
the Axis powers would lose the war.  Therefore, their chief enemy became the 
Communist-led partisan movement.28 
The Partisans fought a savage war with the Axis powers, despite the 





reprisals from the Nazis increased the hatred for the enemy among the 
people of Yugoslavia, driving more of them into the resistance.  Popularity 
for the partisans grew as support for the Cetniks waned. The Partisans 
claimed to represent all Yugoslavs, while the Cetniks were primarily Serbs. 
The Partisans also promised a democratic federated state of brotherhood, 
unity, and equality of peoples.29 
The Ustashes —meaning rebels30—were led by a Fascist named Ante 
Pavelic. When the Nazis invaded Croatia, they set up a puppet government 
with Pavelic as their pawn. Pavelic was the Ustashe leader who organized the 
assassination of King Alexander in 1934. The technique of "depopulation" 
was introduced by the Nazis and given to Pavelic to carry out in Yugoslavia. 
The idea was to first remove the spiritual head, cultural leaders, technical 
specialists and all other individuals with power or intellect to whom the 
country could turn for guidance. The plan, also referred to as "ethnic 
cleansing," was aimed primarily at Serbs, Gypsies, Jews and Muslims. 
However, the Serbs received the greatest number of casualties. Once this was 
complete, the plan was to liquidate the entire region to make room for Aryan 
populations. The Ustashes were essentially part of the Axis forces.31 
During the war, Adolf Hitler, leader of Nazi Germany, gave Heinrich 
Himmler an order "to put a river of blood between the Serbian and Croatian 
peoples. This was a massive effort to forestall the fear that when the 
Germans invaded Russia, mass uprisings might occur all across the Balkans, 
where the people were prone to maintain Slavic bonds with each other and— 
29Ibid, 16. 
■^Translated from the Serbo-Croatian language. 
31Adamic, 36. 
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more importantly- with Russia. It was also a plan to kill off a large number 
of Serbs and instill fear and hatred between the two groups-preventing any 
future collaboration.32 
Of the one and three-quarter million who died in Yugoslavia in WWII, 
over one million of them were victims of the civil war.  The tragic irony in 
this is that the Ustashes were largely made up of society's outcasts -criminals 
and vagrants, German and Hungarian nationals, and ultra-nationalists 
equipped with Italian and German weapons.33 This essentially provided 
justification and legitimacy to every bandit, sadist and mentally disturbed 
person to carry out his every violent desire. The fratricide of the South 
Slavs, which caused lasting hatreds between Croats, Serbs and Muslims, was 
not inspired from the masses, but imposed from above. This situation is 
starkly similar to the one in the former Yugoslavia today. 
C TITO 
The end of WWII brought Josip Broz Tito and the communist party to 
power in Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia was organized as a federation, however, in 
reality functioned as a centralized communist state.   Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
one of the federal units within its own historical borders, and acted as a buffer 
between Croatia and Serbia.  Much in the same way Stalin controlled the 
nationalities of the Soviet Union and kept the lid on ethnic tension, Tito also 
suppressed ethnic conflict within Yugoslavia.  Since the ethnic divisions in 
the former Yugoslavia are made along religious lines, the atheistic 
communist regime was able to remove the ethnic factor at least from the 




to express themselves as a nation in the 1961 census which showed a large 
majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   All three religions—Muslim, Catholic and 
Orthodox- however, peacefully coexisted in Bosnia-Herzegovina which 
made the situation idyllic, in light of the ethnic bloodshed during WWII and 
the Civil War.  Tensions were boiling, however, in the realm of economics 
and the pressure for democracy. This tension was kept under a lid until 
Tito's death.34 
Credit must be given to Tito for constructing and managing Yugoslavia 
after WWII in such a way as to prevent ethnic slaughter from occurring 
again—at least during his lifetime.  During Tito's term and until his death in 
1980, he and his party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the 
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) successfully held the federation together. 
Throughout the Tito years, Yugoslavia flourished economically with its 
material wealth, foreign investors and productivity.  However, after Tito's 
death, the country gradually deteriorated and the party disintegrated in 1990. 
D. POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA 
Arguably, the first signs that the fiber of the Yugoslav idea was 
unraveling began when Josip Broz Tito died in 1980. One of the most 
obvious signs occurred in April 1981 when the Serbian government imposed 
martial law upon the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo.  After 
several days of demonstrations by local Albanians, the military and police 
used brutal force to quell the uprising. The following year was marked by 
thousands of arrests and purges.  Ethnic Albanian government officials and 
party members were killed or deported—evoking memories of Stalinism.  The 
34Zoran Batusic, "E Pluribus Unum?" East European Reporter. (March-April 1992) 22-24. 
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purges quickly reached all non-Serb party members throughout the former 
republics of Yugoslavia during the 1980's.35 
After Kosovo lost its autonomous status, the domination of Serbians 
in the central government of Yugoslavia and in the Yugoslav army 
threatened the other five republics and the autonomous province of 
Vojvodina.  Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia felt threatened by Serb 
domination and soon grasped the idea of democracy- which had been 
spreading throughout Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1990. 
Hatred had to be created, and the key instrument in this was 
television. 36 
The theme of "ancient hatreds"was first introduced by Slobodan 
Milosevic in his campaign for President of Serbia.   Milosevic's monopoly of 
control over the television and radio stations and major newspapers 
throughout the former Yugoslavia played a crucial part in inciting massive 
support during the beginning of the war and sustaining that support for the 
past three years. According to Daniel Plesch of the British American Security 
Infomation Council, "television propaganda was a major force in making, 
and keeping , the people of Serbia and Croatia war-minded and obsessed with 
vengeance."37 Mr. Plesch testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee Hearings on Bosnia, that the war in the former Yugoslavia was, 
while indeed complex and tragic, not caused by ancient hatreds which had 
been waiting to be unleashed throughout the Tito years.  He stated that over 
35Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-1992. (London 
and New York: Verso, 1993), 9. 
^tojan Cerovic, Commentator for the Belgrade weekly, Vreme, quoted by Congressman 
Dornan, house Armed Serviced Committee Hearings, March 1994. 
37See Congressional Records for House Armed Services Hearings on Bosnia, for testimony by 
Daniel Plesch, March 1994. 
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ninety-six percent of households in the war-torn regions of the former 
Yugoslavia had televisions.  The impact Milosevic had on influencing and 
luring the Serbian population throughout Yugoslavia was tremendous, as 
evidenced in the vicious fighting during the past three years. 
For those who are fluent in Balkan history, it is diffiult to attribute the 
origins of the war to "ancient hatreds." The levels of analysis must go further 
than that of "simple blood feuds." The questions must be addressed as to who 
were feuding and from which period in history is the association drawn? 
Was the feud between Serbs and Croatians, Turks and Slavs, Muslims and 
Orthodox, or Ustashes and Cetniks? Precisely which group and what period 
of time are the present-day Serbs identifying? 
This thesis does not attempt to answer these questions, however, they 
are posed to illustrate the initial focus of public debate.  Although "ancient 
hatreds" have played a major role in the Balkans for the past 600 years, the 
current conflict was clearly affected by more recent political tensions after 
Tito's death and the demise of communism. 
Furthermore, the leadership role played by President Milosevic forced 
the catalysm of events which blew up the Balkan "powder keg" and let loose 
the forces of "ancient history." This role, however, was not included as part 
of the major public debate over U.S. foreign policy. Although Milosevic was 
demonized in the press and compared with the likes of Adolf Hitler and 
Joseph Stalin, he was not used by actors in the public debate to justify either 
intervention or non-intervention. 
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
Reactions and actions by the U.S.  government and the public debate 
over the Yugoslav crisis can not be examined without a fundamental 
knowledge of Balkan history-as complex as it is. The realities of the post- 
Cold War period have allowed the world to think in terms of pre-Cold War 
historical events.  The Balkans have routinely taken center stage throughout 
history as the focal point of great power rivalries since the middle ages. The 
significance of this history can not be ignored, nor can it be completely blamed 
for the current crisis. 
The historic complexity of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
most frequently used by isolationists to justify non-intervention during the 
Croatian phase of the war, and first few months of the Bosnian phase. (See 
graph in Appendix A. for graphic illustration)  However, as the humanitarian 
aspect of the war became unbearable to the American public, the "ancient 
hatreds" theory was set aside. 
Balkan history is indeed a complex web of war, nationalism and 
centuries of subjugation. However, there were also long and frequent periods 
of tranquil coexistence between all the peoples which comprised the South 
Slavs. The historic events, briefly summarized in this chapter, should not be 
discounted by those who are quick to label the current situation as a 
"quagmire" born of unleashed "ancient hatreds." 
The following chapter will discuss the actors-both interventionists and 
isolationists- involved in shaping U.S. policy towards the war in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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III. THE ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES 
the President's role is to establish criteria for national 
interests, galvanize interest, explain events, interpret 
motives and ask for support.38 
The approach of U.S. policy towards the crisis in the former Yugoslavia 
was influenced by a small group of actors in 1990 and grew into a major public 
debate by the end of 1993. The President has traditionally been the most 
powerful voice in foreign affairs, however, domestic opinion has played a 
significant role in influencing foreign policy throughout history and even 
more so in recent decades.   The actors involved in shaping the public debate 
over the war in the former Yugoslavia included:  the President; the 
President's Inner Circle; Congress; the media; the American public and ; the 
world community. This chapter will analyze these actors and their roles in 
order to understand how the public debate evolved and how the various 
actors may have influenced one another in shaping the final outcome for 
foreign policy in the former Yugoslavia. 
Both Presidents Bush and Clinton had the opportunity to flex their 
powers as president to push for unilateral or multi-lateral involvement in 
the former Yugoslavia, but chose to remain cautious while yielding the role 
of leader to the European Community. The hesitation by both presidents, 
allowed time for public debate to emerge with a strong and influential voice. 
Because of this, unilateral diplomatic or military intervention in the former 
Yugoslavia could only have been accomplished by presidential initiative. 
^For more discussion on the role of the President in the post-Cold War world, see Catherine 
McArdle Kelleher's "Security in the New Order: Presidents, Polls, and the Use of Force" in 
Daniel Yankelovich and I.M. Destler, eds. Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. 
Foreign Policy. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1994) 225-252. 
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History clearly shows how every major conflict in the twentieth 
century-from WW I to the Gulf War-in which the U.S. eventually became 
involved was supported by a reluctant American public after strong 
presidential initiative worked to garner support.  However, initiatives for 
multi-lateral intervention in the former Yugoslavia-either diplomatic or 
military-have been supported by the U.S. under NATO or UN auspices only 
for the delivery of humanitarian aid and only after a peace agreement is 
signed by all warring parties. 
As the crisis in the Balkans progressed from 1990 into 1992, U.S. public 
debate over the situation grew stronger and pressure on the U.S. government 
to intervene mounted first on President Bush, and then President Clinton. 
A. THE PRESIDENT 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution gave the President a significant 
amount of power in foreign affairs and defense matters. They recognized the 
potential need of the President to take quick and decisive action on matters 
whose window of opportunity for action might not be wide enough for the 
long and cumbersome procedures of debate and argument characteristic of a 
legislative body.39 
President George Washington's warning of "entangling alliances" in 
his farewell address has been evoked by isolationists each time the U.S. 
considered entering an overseas conflict. The current Balkan crisis is no 
exception.  Non-interventionists have used this warning as well as the 
disastrous experience in the Vietnam conflict to keep the U.S. out of Bosnia. 
39Roger Hilsman, Laura Gaughran, Patricia A. Weitsman The Politics of Policy Making in 
Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics 3rd ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ:  Prentice Hall, 1993) 137. 
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At a time when the world was allowed to breath a sigh of relief after 
four decades of living behind the fear of thermo-nuclear war, the American 
public was not willing to jump into a conflict overseas which did not directly 
threaten peace at home.  U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War was too 
recent for President Bush to make another attempt to garner support for U.S. 
intervention in another overseas crisis.  However, there was also no attempt 
to use Presidential initiative to intervene as he did before the Gulf War. 
There are many examples in history where the President used his 
power in foreign affairs during crises overseas before consulting with 
Congress or the American public. President Truman ordered troops into the 
Korean Conflict. President Eisenhower sent troops into Lebanon. President 
Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnam.  President Nixon ordered 
the mining of Haiphong Harbor and the invasion of Cambodia. President 
Ford took policy positions on detente with the Soviet Union and the SALT 
talks. President Carter froze eight billion dollars in Iranian assets, imposed 
trade sanctions and pressured allies to join in, and dispatched a fleet to the 
Persian Gulf. President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada and Bush 
ordered the invasion of Panama.40 
Due to the above examples and especially the experiences of Watergate 
and Vietnam, Congress established the War Powers Act of 1973 in order to 
curb the powers of the President. However, the above examples of 
intervention by Reagan and Bush clearly illustrates the lack of enforcement 
or regard given to the Act. The weight of Presidential authority and power in 
foreign affairs still carries much weight. Congress and the American public 
40Ibid, 136. 
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have, however, become more active in voicing their opinions on foreign 
policy initiatives since the collective experiences of Watergate and Vietnam. 
In all fairness, the role of the President is indeed a difficult one in 
which the responsibility to juggle numerous issues-both foreign and 
domestic-are vast. During the first two years of the Yugoslav crisis, President 
Bush had much on his agenda, which included numerous left-over issues to 
contend with, including: 1) The Persian Gulf War and its aftermath; 2) The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union; 3) The upcoming Presidential election 
campaign; 4) The declining U.S. economy; and 5) Somalia.   However, it is 
also the job of the President to be able to handle a variety of issues and crises 
by careful delegation and reliance on a loyal and knowledgeable "inner circle" 
of advisors and their staffs. 
B. THE PRESIDENT'S "INNER CIRCLE" 
For the purpose of this thesis, the "inner circle" of advisors to the 
President includes the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and 
the people who work for them-this includes the State Department, the CIA, 
and the National Security Council. 
The role of the Secretary of State is most accurately illustrated by 
Graham Allison as a combination of roles all expected to be acted out 
simultaneously. These roles include:  1) Senior personal advisor to the 
President on the political and military issues; 2) The colleague of the 
President's other senior advisors on problems of foreign policy; 3) The 
ranking U.S. diplomat on negotiations with foreign powers; 4) The primary 
representative of the administration's foreign affairs and a defender of the 
actions of the administration and; 6) The administration's voice to the 
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outside world.41 In order to fulfill the requirements of these roles, the 
President Bush relied on an "inner circle" of advisors in addition to Secretary 
of State James Baker and later Lawrence Eagleburger. He frequently turned to 
his "inner circle" which consisted of Secretary Baker, National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, White House chief of staff John Sununu and the 
Secretary of Defense. 
The National Security Advisor normally works closely with the 
Secretary of State and the President in dealing with foreign affairs policy 
questions.  In the Bush administration, the President relied upon the 
expertise and advice of James Baker and Brent Scowcroft throughout his term 
with regard to the Yugoslav crisis. 
C THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
Congress has historically allowed much leverage for the President to 
act unilaterally in foreign affairs policy issues. However, as noted above, 
Congress began to take a new interest in becoming more knowledgeable and 
hence more influential in foreign policy matters since the Vietnam and 
Watergate era. 42 Debate and argument over emotional issues such as human 
rights and humanitarian affairs in war torn areas of the world have filled the 
Congressional records over the years. The war in the former Yugoslavia has 
been debated in Congress for the past three years on an almost continuing 
basis. 
During the first two years of Yugoslavia's demise, there were merely a 
handful of Senators and Congressmen who were interested in the Balkan 
^Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision. 
42See Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent for discussion of Congress' evolving interests in 
foreign affairs and defense issues and its attempt to wield greater influence over government 
policy. 
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crisis-they included:  Senators Dole, Deconcini, Lugar, Lieberman, Biden and 
Congressman McCloskey. It was not until late 1992, when the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina became headline news, that the Congressional debate over what 
to do about the war was inflamed by the media. The voices in Congress and 
the Senate multiplied by the beginning of 1993, which also placed more 
pressure on the newly elected Clinton administration to define its policy. 
This thesis will present empirical data which serves to illustrate the 
connection between the media's reporting of the war in Yugoslavia, 
Congressional activity and policy outcomes. 
D. THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION 
it is in the nature of democracies to have, for the most 
part, the most confused or erroneous ideas on external 
affairs, and to decide questions of foreign policy on 
purely domestic considerations.43 
Alexis Tocqueville spoke the above words over fifteen years ago, yet 
they still ring true today.  The leaders of American government can not 
escape the requirement to listen to domestic opinion when dealing with 
foreign affairs. This is due in large part, to the aggressive growth of political 
lobbies and widespread public access to the media, as well as a general increase 
in public awareness in foreign affairs over the past few decades. 
Americans rely on television images more than ever to frame their 
international opinions about world events.   Images of the war in Vietnam 
brought the stark realities of the bloody business of war into the homes of 
nearly every American  during the 1970's.   Mainstream magazines provided 
images of chemical warfare used by Sadaam Hussein on the Kurdish 
43Quote by Alexis Tocqueville in George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition 
(Chicago: The Universitty of Chicago Press, 1984) 176. 
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population in Iraq, which served to tug at the emotions of Americans.  The 
advent of satellite communications paved the way for the "CNN factor", 
which played a major role during the Gulf War, which gave Americans real- 
time experiences of the war in the Middle East. The use of "soundbites" to 
capture the images of massive suffering in distant lands was the catalyst 
which sent American troops into Somalia in 1992. For Yugoslavia, CNN did 
not arrive on the scene until the gruesome images of concentration camps 
and marketplace bombings were available. Unfortunately, sound bites and 
CNN images can only capture one aspect of war and suffering and may serve 
only to oversimplify extremely complicated situations.  However, it is more 
unfortunate that it sometimes requires the use of media images and 
sensational news stories, which play on the emotions of the American public 
before the government will act on foreign policy issues. This was clearly 
evident in the televised hunger in Somalia as compared to the untelevised 
situation in the Sudan.44 
According to Gallup opinion polls taken between 1992 and 1993, the 
American public was more likely to favor intervention into Bosnia- 
Herzegovina for humanitarian reasons rather than to intervene in a civil war 
or to promote nation-building.45   There were certain key words used in the 
Gallup polls which indicated the tendency for Americans to vote 
emotionally.  For instance, in 1993, after news of concentration camps and 
"ethnic-cleansing" became widespread among American public, and the 
words "moral",   "humanitarian" or "ethnic cleansing" were used, Americans 
44Catherine McArdle Kelleher in Daniel Yankelovich and I.M. Destler, eds. Beyond the 
Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foriegn Policy. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1994)234. 
45See Gallup Opinion Poll 28-29 January 1993. 
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were more likely to consider intervention.   When asked what they 
considered good reasons for the U.S. to consider military intervention in 
Bosnia, sixty-three percent of Americans mentioned a moral obligation to 
stop "ethnic cleansing"; fifty-seven percent cited stopping the spread of ethnic 
conflict in Europe; and only forty-nine percent claimed that U.S. "national 
security interests" were at stake.46   In early to mid-1992, the majority of 
Americans voted against the U.S. taking the lead in UN-backed air strikes and 
ground troops in Bosnia, but the words "humanitarian" and "ethnic- 
cleansing" were not mentioned and not yet part of the language used by the 
media in describing the Yugoslav conflict.47 
E. THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
The current war in the Balkans had the greatest impact on Europe.  The 
EC, in particular, feared the overwhelming flow of refugees and the potential 
for the war to spill over into neighboring European countries.  Turkey, 
Greece, Hungary and Romania were especially concerned with these issues.48 
Throughout the Cold War, Western Europe enjoyed the security 
umbrella provided by the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) while Eastern Europe had the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. 
At the end of the Cold War, NATO and U.S. downsizing and the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Treaty Organization created a security vacuum in Eastern 
Europe which caused alarm in Western Europe as well. The lack of a stable 
and credible collective security system in the Balkans allowed the current 
^See CNN/USA Today poll Bosnia, May 6, 1993. 
47See Gallup Opinion Polls in July 1992, Januarly 24-26 1993, February 12-14 1993,and May 6 
1993. 
48Michael Dewar, "Intervention in Bosnia-the Case Against," The World Today, ( February 
1993). 
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Situation to develop unabated from crisis to tragedy within a year after the 
Cold War ended. Hesitation in countering crisis where a security vacuum 
existed proved to be the death of the state known as Yugoslavia. 
The United Nations (UN) entered the public debate regarding the 
former Yugoslavia almost from the first signs of instability and continues to 
play a central role in an attempt to negotiate a settlement and end to the war. 
Created toward the end and as a result of WWII, the preamble of the 
UN Charter states its purpose is, "to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind..."49   In view of the post-Cold War era, in which the U.S., as the 
only remaining superpower can not provide security and diplomatic services 
to the entire world, the UN, as stated in its Charter, is the most logical and 
legitimate organization to do so.  However, without an enforcement arm to 
ensure the peaceful settlements of disputes and to keep the new emerging 
threats at bay, the UN and its numerous resolutions may be deemed useless. 
The UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia, under the title UN Protection 
Forces (UNPROFOR,) were provided only for the purposes of ensuring the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. In 1993, U.S. troops were sent to Macedonia, 
under the auspices of UNPROFOR. The mandate in Macedonia was one 
more suited to its capability, which was to provide preventive diplomacy and 
provide a buffer from Serbia. When the war broke out in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was sent to provide for the safe delivery of 
humanitarian aid and to ensure the creation of "safe areas." 
49For complete text of the UN Charter, see Bennet, A. LeRoy, International Organizations: 
Principles and Issues. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1991), 435-436. 
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Attempts have also been made by the UN to mediate the crisis through 
diplomatic negotiation.  UN mediators, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen 
proposed the well-known "Vance-Owen Plan" toward the end of 1992. This 
plan was rejected by both the Serbs and Muslims and denounced by President 
Clinton. Later attempts were made to revise the plan to suit the requests of 
President Clinton and the warring parties. These efforts have only produced 
marginal results and have not put an end to the war or suffering. 
The actors involved in the public debate emerged at different times 
during the initial phase of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.  The first phase 
will be referred to as the Croatian phase and the second as the Bosnian phase. 
The following chapter examines the evolution of public debate during the 
Croatian phase of the war. 
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IV. PRELUDE TO CRISIS-THE WARNING SIGNS 1989-1991 
In order to understand the way in which public debate over U.S. 
foreign policy was shaped in regard to the former Yugoslavia, it is necessary to 
examine the events which drove the crisis into war. One of the major issues 
discussed in this chapter is the impact of the end of the Cold War on the 
republics in the former Yugoslavia. The first free elections in thirty-eight 
years brought a democratic government into power in all of the republics of 
the former Yugoslavia except Serbia and Montenegro. The forces of 
democracy posed a direct and imminent threat to those communist leaders 
left over from the Tito era. Another issue which exacerbated the struggle for 
power included regional discrimination between ethnic groups.  Although 
not widespread, the in-fighting between ethnic groups was used by the 
Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian President, to exploit historic ethnic rivalries. 
This issue is discussed as the "Milosevic factor." The third issue discussed in 
this chapter, is the impact of instability in the autonomous province of 
Kosovo on launching the movement for secession by Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Two of the actors involved in shaping initial U.S. public debate are 
discussed for their attempts to warn the American government and the world 
about the political tensions brewing in the former Yugoslavia.  The impact of 
these warnings among the American media, public, President and his inner 
circle, is examined to understand how U.S. foreign policy was shaped in the 
beginning of the crisis. 
The end of the Cold War reduced but did not eliminate the 
requirement to intervene in the internal politics of other nations.   This 
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requirement was demonstrated in Kuwait, Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, 
Rwanda, Cuba, Macedonia , Russia and of course, the former Yugoslavia-to 
name a few. However, in each of these post-cold war cases, intervention was 
executed in the form of crisis management rather than crisis prevention. 
And in all of these cases, crisis was certainly predicted well ahead of time. 
These crises are but signals for what may be in store for the world in the near 
future. 
The origins of current crisis in the former Yugoslavia were not the 
result of unleashed nationalism and ethnic hatreds-suppressed during the 
Cold War-as some would surmise.50 Tito's death left a political vacuum in 
Yugoslavia which gave his communist-trained minions a chance to fight for 
power. The political turmoil which followed was the result of this power 
struggle between communist elites. However, when the Cold War ended so 
abruptly toward the end of the decade, the struggle over power evolved into a 
fight between democratic factions and the communist-turned-socialist 
factions—led by Slobodan Milosevic. 
A. THE "MILOSEVIC FACTOR" AND ETHNO-NATIONALISM 
In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences published The 
Memorandum, which broadly outlined the reluctance and validity of the goal 
of a Greater Serbia.  One of the key elements of this manifesto proclaimed that 
the national question of the Serbian people was dashed by the communists at 
the end of WWII since "it did not get its own state like other peoples." It also 
focused on the unfairness of the federation, which it accused as being 
discriminatory towards Serbs.  This accusation pointed blame towards the 
^For example, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, 72 
(Summer 1993). 
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Slovenes and Croats, who in fact, became the most economically prosperous 
of the republics.51 
Ethno-nationalism and ultra-nationalism were merely the means used 
and exploited for political ends by power seekers in Serbia. The first signs of 
this exploitation came in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which is 
situated within the republic of Serbia. The regime in Croatia, under the 
leadership of Franjo Tudgman, also had a reputation for discriminatory 
treatement of minorities-which happened to be Serbs in that republic. 
However, Milosevic took his power one step further and mounted a 
campaign of discrimination and oppression against the majority Albanian 
population in Kosovo, which led to the events which sparked the current 
war. 
The "ancient hatreds" theory was, in fact propelled by Milosevic and 
the JNA in order to garner support for his plans for a Greater Serbia. His 
control of the media allowed this exploitation of historic conflict to happen 
with great ease and swiftness. He initially approached his nationalist 
campaign by painting Serbs as victims of everyone from the Albanians in 
Kosovo to the Roman Catholics in the Vatican. 
B. SIGNS OF INSTABILITY 
The province of Kosovo is situated in the southern portion of the 
republic of Serbia and borders Albania. Serbs claim it to be the center of their 
medieval kingdom and cradle of Serbian civilization.  Today, over ninety 
percent of the population is ethnically Albanian.  Kosovo was granted 
autonomy within Serbia in 1946 along  with the province of Vojvodina. 
51
 For further discussion of The Memorandum, see Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 
1991: Political and Military Dimensions," The Tournal of Strategic Studies, (September 1993). 
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Until the late 1960's these autonomous provinces were not represented in 
federal bodies and had governing statutes rather than constitutions. Serbia 
could also modify their borders at will. However, with the support of 
Croatian nationalist liberals, by the late 1970's Kosovo and Vojvodina shared 
the same rights and privileges as the six republics with the following 
exceptions: 1) the possession of a provincial flag; 2) provincial citizenship; 
and 3) legal claim to the right of secession (which was guaranteed to the six 
republics.) Other than these symbolic vestiges, Kosovo and Vojvodina were, 
for all practical purposes, equal to the republics.52 
Soon after Tito's death in 1980, Kosovo's peaceful coexistence with 
Serbia was terminated. In April 1981, Kosovo was placed under martial law 
after several days of mass demonstrations and riots by the local Albanian 
population.  The crackdown in Kosovo  resulted in thousands of arrests 
throughout the remainder of the decade and the complete loss of autonomy 
to Serbia. 
In 1989, Serbia amended its constitution to assert greater control over 
the administrative and government affairs of its two provinces.  This led to 
further unrest and violence in Kosovo which culminated in the summer  of 
1990 with Kosovo's complete loss of its autonomy to Serbia.53 
The instability in Kosovo was the first significant sign of Yugoslavia's 
imminent crisis after the Cold War.  The problems in Kosovo served as clear 
warnings to Croatia and Slovenia that democracy was not being fully 
embraced by Serbia and that more trouble was afoot. Croatia and Slovenia 
52Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 76. 
53Ibid, 78. 
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were vocal about their protest against Serbia's treatment of the Albanians in 
Kosovo. However, Serbia's government, led by Slobodan Milosevic met 
Slovenia's criticism of the Kosovo policy with open hostility by a unilateral 
declaration of an economic boycott against Slovenia. Croatia and 
Macedonia's protests prompted Serbia to push and support Serbian separatist 
groups within those republics.54 
The republics of Slovenia and Croatia responded immediately to these 
events by taking advantage of the collapse of communism and secessionist 
movements in the Baltics and Eastern Europe and planning for their first 
democratic elections and eventual independence. The general fear was that 
what they saw happening in Kosovo would surely follow in the other 
republics. 
C FIRST FREE ELECTIONS SINCE WWII 
By 1990 the signs of Yugoslavia's imminent break-up became clear with 
the first round of fully democratic elections within the former Yugoslavia in 
over forty years.   Croatia and Slovenia made no attempts to shroud their 
desire to become independent, democratic republics.  The majority parties 
rather openly discussed their wishes during the election campaign for a looser 
confederation and decentralized government within Yugoslavia.  Croatia and 
Slovenia did not, however, discuss full secession until 1991.  However, when 
Slovenia and Croatia realized that Serbia would not only block these wishes 
but also move for greater centralized control with a dominant Serbian- 
communist-- leadership, Croatia and Slovenia hastened their plans for full 
secession. 
^Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, eds. The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of 
Democraticc Transformation. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) 80. 
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When the first free elections in Yugoslavia were held in April and May 
of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia voted for administrative independence and 
democracy. This was not a vote for complete secession, but clearly 
demonstrated their desire to distance themselves from the central 
government and the communist-led republic of Serbia.    The two republics 
favored a loose confederation, however separate and distinct from the ruling 
communist central government.  Prior to the elections, Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic publicly warned the other republics that any attempts 
toward independence would prompt aggressive action from Serb nationalists. 
By July, Slovenia and Croatia were ready to present a new constitution 
declaring its complete secession from Yugoslavia. On August 18,1990, 
hundreds of armed Serbs sealed off towns and blocked roads in Croatia in 
order to rally for a referendum on local autonomy of the ethnic Serb 
population in Croatia.55 
The first free elections in postwar Yugoslavia proved to be the turning 
point for the Communist Party and the Yugoslavia created by Tito and the 
prelude to war. By the end of November 1990 Yugoslavia was bursting with 
over 217 registered parties and more than that number of unregistered 
parties.  Yugoslavia made the transformation from forty-five years of political 
monopoly to political pluralism was made almost over  nite.   Although the 
party explosion still continues, it can be broken down into three basic 
ideologies:  a relatively heterogenous socialist left; a conglomeratee of 
traditional conservative parties; and a group of liberal democratic parties and 
groups. There is also an absence of extreme left and extreme right blocs.56 
55The New York Times. (20 AUG 1990.) 
56Ibid,179. 
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Both Slovenia and Croatia voted out the Communist Party the Democratic 
United Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) and Croatian Democratic Union 
won the most Assembly seats in each respective republic. Milan Kucan was 
elected President of Slovenia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia.  Both republics 
achieved their long awaited goals of greater autonomy and more political 
liberalization. However, three things stood in their way—Belgrade, Slobodan 
Milosevic and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). 
In addition to the Serbian domination of the JNA, one of the most 
significant danger signals sent to Slovenia and Croatia was Serbia's 
domination and ultimate overthrow of the autonomous province of Kosovo. 
Slovenia and Croatia perceived the human rights violations and increased 
violence in Kosovo between 1989 and 1990 as a foreshadow of things to come 
in the rest of the republics. 
D. THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM AND SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY 
The historic events of 1989 began with the collapse of communism in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and continued with the emergence of 
many struggling and hopeful new democracies.    Throughout the following 
year the post-communist countries had to contend with the prospects of their 
new found freedoms and scrambled for a sense of organization. The original 
signs of hope and vision disappeared quickly as the new democracies faced 
economic and administrative chaos. 
The break up of Yugoslavia was preceded by several signs of instability 
and turmoil.  Croatia and Slovenia made no attempts to shroud their desire 
to become indpendent, democratic republics after seeing the disaster in 
Kosovo unfold. They rather openly discussed their preferences for a looser 
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confederation and decentralized government within Yugoslavia as opposed 
to full secession.   Serbia met Slovenia's 
Democratic-style government and administration was entirely new to 
the leaders of the former Yugoslav republics, who needed time to organize 
and learn about the processes of democracy. The time required for this 
transition, however, was not allowed to even begin before war engulfed the 
entire region. 
E. THE HELSKINKI COMMISSION ISSUES WARNINGS 
The international community did not immediately respond to the 
Kosovo crisis in 1989 and was not prepared for the violent break-up of 
Yugoslavia two years later. However, the Commission of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which established the Helsinki Commission 
to monitor human rights abuses and democratic development in East and 
Central Europe after the fall of communism in the Soviet Union monitored 
the events in the former Yugoslavia from 1990 to the present.57    Senator 
Dennis Deconcini, Chairman of the committee, led the Helsinki Commission 
in a visit to Yugoslavia in April 1990. Their purpose was to 1) Observe the 
first free, multi-party elections in post-war Yugoslavia; 2) Discuss and 
investigate human rights issues; and 3) Examine the situation in Kosovo by 
interviewing Serbian and Albanian groups.  In its official report and in news 
releases written upon conclusion of the visit, the commission indicated that 
57The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was established in 1976 
to monitor and encourage progress in implementing the provisions of the CSCE Final Act or 
Helsinki Acccords. The purpose of the Final Act was to address every aspect of relations 
between states, including: military-security; economic, scientific and environmental 
cooperation; cultural and educational exchanges; and human rights and other humanitarian 
concerns.   The goal of the commission is to lower the barriers which have aritficially divided 
Eurrope into East and West for more than four decades,.The commission is made up of 9 Senators, 
9 Representatives and an official each from the Department of State, Commerce and Defense. 
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Kosovo's ethnic crisis had affected the entire country.  The human rights 
abuses were confirmed by the commission through first-hand knowledge of 
political prisoners sentenced for their associations or even sympathies for 
political opposition.58 
The commission also reported that the "rise in Serbian nationalism 
which Milosevic has merged with a defense of the Communist system, has 
aroused fears that Serbian assertion of control of its two provinces will 
eventually turn into Serbian attempts to dominate the whole of 
Yugoslavia."59  This warning was not fully realized by the international 
community until it was too late and Serbia had moved in on Croatia and 
Slovenia.  The CSCE produced volumes of material which took into account 
the political, cultural, religious and ethnic history of the Balkans in order to 
offer sound advice and warning with regard to the current crisis. Without 
the capability to enforce their proposals, however, the CSCE's warnings 
proved futile. 
F. INITIAL U.S. POLICY TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA 
The Bush administration made clear announcements during June and 
July 1991 that the U.S. would not support seccession movements in 
Yugoslavia. One of the major factors affecting President Bush's decision to 
support Yugoslav unity was apprehension over the imminent demise of the 
Soviet Union.and the independent movements in the Baltics and East- 
Central Europe.  After the Berlin Wall came down and former Communist 
^Report of the Congressional Delegation Visit to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, April 7-13,1990. 
59Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: A Compendium of Reports on the Elections Held 
from March through June 1990, Compled by the Staff of the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe Washington D.C. July 1990. 
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satellites embraced democracy and broke away from their Soviet hegemon, 
Yugoslavia's republics also felt the winds of democracy.  The U.S., however, 
was concerned over the future of the Soviet Union and apprehensive over 
the possibility of its break-up.   This theme is an historical repeat of WWI 
when Wilson clearly preferred to deal with the larger Russian Empire as 
opposed to several smaller, less stable states. The break-up of Yugoslavia was 
not endorsed by the U.S.. for fear of sending signals to the former Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, the break-up was also not actively blocked by the 
U.S. or E.C. 
1. Baker's Green Light to the Serbs 
In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia were preparing for elections and a 
move toward independence.  Two weeks before their announcement, U.S. 
Secretary of State, James Baker made a trip to Yugoslavia to plead with 
Croatian and Slovenian leaders  to hold Yugoslavia together.  He stated that 
the U.S. would not recognize the new republics and that "instability and 
breakup of Yugoslavia could have some very tragic consequences,not only 
here, but more broadly in Europe."60 Less than a week after Baker's 
notorious visit, Slovenia and Croatia became independent nations.  Three 
days later they were under attack by the Yugoslav Army. The federal 
government in Yugoslavia responded to the break-away republics by calling 
their actions "illegal" and ordered national army and police units to seize 
control posts  along Slovenia's borders.61 Although both declarations of 
independence used the words "disassociation" from Yugoslavia, both Kucan 
60Alan Riding, "Europeans Warn on Yugoslav Split," The New York Times (25 June 1991). 
61Chuck Sudetic, "Two Yugoslav States Vote Independence to Press Demands," The New York 
Times. (26 Tune 1991). 
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and Tudjman continued to stress their eagerness to discuss the creation of a 
new more loosely confederated Yugoslav union.62 However, the willingness 
of Slovenia and Croatia to negotiate was not followed by any mediation 
efforts from the West. The Serbians would only accept a loose confederation 
if all of Yugoslavia's Serbs were brought into a single state. Croatia and 
Bosnia had a large Serbian minority and therefore, opposed this idea. This is 
when confusion over labeling the situation in the former Yugoslavia began. 
Depending on how one viewed the combatants and victims, it was labeled as: 
a crisis; a war; a civil war; an invasion of state borders; an insurrection or; the 
beginning of World War HI. Regardless of how it started or how it was 
initially labeled, it can now be defined as: genocide committed upon an 
unarmed civilian population in the bloodiest conflict in Europe since WWII. 
Many have later argued that Baker's comments were construed by the Serbs- 
-in particular Milosevic-as the "green light" which allowed them to attack 
Slovenia and Croatia and commence the violence in the former Yugoslavia 
which has lasted to the present. 
G. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC AGENDAS 
Yugoslavia got caught between 
Maastrict and the Soviet union— 
between the process of integration 
and disintegration.63 
The year 1991 was marked by several major events which can be argued 
to have taken the attention away from Yugoslavia.  One of those events was 
the planning for the December Maastrict Conference which was to amend the 
1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1987 Single European Act to create an economic 
62Ibid. 
63John Newhouse, "Dodging the Diplomatic Round," The New Yorker. (24 August 1992) 12. 
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and monetary union in Europe by 1999.  The European Community was 
gearing up for this event in hopes of negotiating a treaty which would unite 
all of Europe economically -including a common currency--as well as 
politically. After Germany was reunified in 1990, much of Europe-especially 
France—was anxious for European unification and made Maastricht a top 
priority. Trouble in Yugoslavia was therefore viewed as a possible setback 
toward this goal—especially once the violence began.  Differences in opinion 
over what to do about Yugoslavia threatened to disrupt the unity desired 
among the European countries who were pushing for the Maastricht Treaty. 
Especially vocal about this were German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.  The overall effect was that 
Yugoslavia did not receive the full amount of attention it required which 
inevitably gave the Serbian aggressors the message that without a unified 
front in the West, nothing was standing in their way. 
President Bush clearly demonstrated the might and power of the U.S. 
during the Gulf War in 1990 and had no political need to further demonstrate 
superiority in another faraway land with no immediate economic national 
interests at hand.  Anthony Lewis compared this policy with an analogy to 
Neville Chamberlain explaining in 1938 why Britons should not care about 
Nazi designs on Czechoslovakia—It was a"quarrel in a faraway country 
between people of whom we know nothing."64 The world was no longer in 
imminent danger of nuclear holocaust which relieved some of the pressure 
to act as guardian of democracy-regardless of how new. Once the decision 
was made, the justifications for non-intervention in the former Yugoslavia 
^Anthony Lewis, "Yesterday's Man," The New York Times (3 Aug 1992). 
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came flooding through the halls of the State Department, Congress, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the White House's inner circle. 
1. The Inner Circle 
According to U.S. State Department officicals the Yugoslav crisis was 
clearly not a priority in U.S. foreign policy between 1989 and 1993. There was 
never a massive effort to either apply preventive measures in the Balkans 
nor to press for a way to intervene diplomatically or militarily once it actually 
became a full-blown crisis. Once the decision was made by the inner circle of 
the White House to keep a distance from the Yugoslav crisis, the marching 
orders were passed down through the State Department and policy was set. 
Diplomatic and especially military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was 
not considered on the list of priorities by the White House. 
According to State Department officials, Spokesman, Margaret Tutwiler 
was considered the most influential person to James Baker and the inner 
circle during the initial phases of the Yugoslav crisis. In May 1991, Tutwiler 
announced that White House policy toward Yugoslavia was marked by 
support for Yugoslav unity, human rights, democratic rights, civil liberties 
and market reforms.65 Tutwiler was well-informed of the events occurring 
in the former Yugoslavia and maintained close laison with the State 
Department's Yugoslav Desk Officer and East European specialists. However, 
official U.S. policy was only conveyed through Tutwiler after clearance was 
obtained by Baker. For the most part, Baker served as speaker for White 
House policy. But his words were only heard a handful of times in the six 
65Margaret Tutwiler, "U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia," U.S. Department of State Dispatch 
(24 May 1991), 395. 
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months following the secession movements and the onslaught of violence in 
Croatia and Slovenia.66 
It was not until word of the Yugoslav crisis became public knowledge 
that members of the legislative branch of government became involved in 
influencing  policy. 
2. Congress and Senate 
Several Congressmen and Senators became involved in  seeking a 
solution to the problems in the former Yugoslavia as early as 1990. Most of 
the substantial work accomplished, however was under the auspices of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and was focused 
mainly on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis. 
The United States, the European Community 
and the UN have failed to effectively confront 
the  humanitarian fallout of Serb nationalism 
gone wild. It is axiomatic that such failure leads 
to a massive body count.67 
The CSCE  or Helsinki Commission began following the events in 
former Yugoslavia in 1990.  Co-Chairs, Senator Dennis DeConcini  and Steny 
H. Hoyer have made regular public statements and issued periodic reports 
and newsletter articles on Yugoslav political affairs. Between 1990 and 1994 
four delegations were sent to former Yugoslavia in order to observe elections 
and human rights violations.   The members of the commission—nine 
Congressmen and nine Senators-- have submitted several bills of legislation 
^According to the number of New York Times articles, James Baker was quoted five times 
between June and December 1991 with regard to the Yugoslav crisis. 
^Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe One Hundred Third 
Congress First Session "War Crimes and the Humanitarian Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia," 
January 25,1993. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) 125. 
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to promote an expedient and final end to the war in Bosnia. None of them 
have been implemented. 
Apart from the Helsinki Commission, Senator Bob Dole was one of the 
most vocal legislators who spoke out on behalf of democracy in the republics 
of the former Yugoslavia. Senator Dole offered strong statements in February 
1991 at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee with regard to the threat of 
Communism in four struggling new democracies within the former 
Yugoslavia. He stated that, "the current crisis in Yugoslavia is a direct result 
of the spread of democracy to Eastern Europe: the problem in Yugoslavia, 
however, is that democracy did not spread far enough."68 Senator Dole made 
similar comments, pleading for direct aid through the Direct Aid For 
Democracy Act, S.9, which would give the U.S. the flexibility to provide aid to 
republic level governments that are on the road to democracy, but exist 
within countries that have governments at the republic or federal level that 
are communist controlled. 
3. Reaction From The Media and Public 
Between July and December 1991 there were over seventy articles 
printed in mainstream American journals and magazines regarding the 
former Yugoslavia. The topics were focused on the struggle for democracy, 
human rights, Balkan violence, ethnic tensions and historic precedence for 
violence. Many of the articles referred to the World War I metaphor of the 
"Balkan Powder Keg" and issued warnings of historic repetition. They also 
spoke of the danger inherent in the drive for a greater Serbia as asserted by 
Slobodan Milosevic and his converted communist party, now called the 
^Bob Dole, "Yugoslavia: Direct Aid for Democratic Republics," Statement of Senator Bob 
Dole Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 21 February 1991. 
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Yugoslav Socialist Party.  The number of articles printed in The New York 
Times  during this time-frame exceeded four-hundred and forty.  Most of 
these articles reported on the violence within the former Yugoslavia and the 
escalation of war.  During this time-frame the crisis in the former Yugoslavia 
was referred to by the New York Times  and most of the mainstream articles 
as a civil war created by ethnic tensions. 
Between 1990 and 1993 there were several opportunities for the U.S. to 
intervene on a preventive scale in the Yugoslav crisis.  The first came during 
1990 when a wealthy Serbian-born California businessman decided to run for 
President of Serbia against Milosevic. Prime Minister of the federal 
government of the rump state of Yugoslavia, Milan Panic offered a stabilizing 
connection with the West for Serbians in fear of another Tito-style 
government.  The first free elections in Serbia since 1938 came in November 
1990.  Panic did not, however, receive the support he had wished for from the 
U.S.  Milosevic won more than 56 percent of the vote.  This was hardly 
surprising in view of his complete monopoly over every form of media for 
use in his campaign.69 
H. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ISSUES WARNINGS 
On November 28,1990, the US. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
State Department issued warnings to the White House that Yugoslavia was in 
imminent danger of a violent breakup and perhaps civil war.  The CIA 
predicted the break-up would occur "most probably in the next 18 months."70 
The CIA cited statements by Yugoslavia's  Prime Minister Ante Markovic 
69For details on Milan Panic's campaign, see Obrad Kesis, "Serbia: The Politics of Despair," 
Current History. (November 1993) 378-380. 
70David Binder, "Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon," The New York Times. (28 Nov 1990). 
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saying, "The situation is characterized by growing nationalism and separatism 
and an alarming worsening of ethnic relations, all of which is expressed in 
violence, a drastic threat to public order, peace and citizens' safety."71 The 
report issued by the CIA also included a warning that Serbian republic 
president Slobodan Milosevic was chiefly to blame for instigating the latest 
repression of Kosovo's Albanians and for stirring Serbian nationalism.  In 
response to these warnings, the White House made a formal announcement 
that it favored Yugoslav unity and supported Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic's federal government.  There was no attempt at diplomacy or 
peaceful dialogue by the U.S. or Europe as a result of these warnings. 
The State Department reported on the events taking place in the 
former Yugoslavia on a daily basis by maintaining constant communications 
with foreign service correspondents in Belgrade. Their findings, if read by the 
"inner circle" would have illustrated in plain language the dangerous 
situation developing in the Balkans during 1990-1991. The newly elected 
Slovenian and Croatian administrations were both based on anti-communist 
and anti-socialist doctrines— aimed directly at the Serbian regime of President 
Slobodan Milosevic.  Milosevic's threats to demand territory from 
neighboring republics to bring all of the country's 8.5 million Serbs into a 
single Serbian state, were major factors leading to the secession of Croatia and 
Slovenia in 1990.  The drive for independence, however was met with 




The Yugoslav military organization, led by General Veljko Kadijevic, 
Federal Secretary for National Defense, announced during the Yugoslav 
People's Army (YPA) Party Conference that the military would support a 
society under "true socialism" and would oppose anti-socialist, pro-capitalist, 
and dogmatic forces. He made it clear that the army was prepared to fight 
against the "forces which are pulling Yugoslavia apart and undermining her 
defense strengths against the proponents f anti-communism and dogmatism, 
as well as all those who attack Tito and the achievements of the 
revolution."72 
The CIA made attempts to warn the White House of the dangers 
inherent in: a) a strong communist party in Yugoslavia; and b) a blurring in 
the distinction between civil and military control of policy. However, by 1991, 
the situation in Yugoslavia had quickly escalated from a state of unrest to all 
out war.  The warning signs in Kosovo and the transformation from 
communism to democracy in four of the six republics proved to be the 
turning point for the Yugoslav idea created in 1918.  The CIA's predictions 
came true even earlier than originally surmised.  The violent break-up of 
Yugoslavia began within six months of the CIA's report. 
If the CIA's detailed and full report on the pending crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia was released toThe New York Times in August 1990, one can 
certainly assume that the "inner circle" received an advance copy long before 
August.  However, regardless of the numerous warning signs, the situation 
in Yugoslavia developed on its tragic course without outside intervention or 
72Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, eds., The Tragedy of Yugoslavia, (New York: M.E. Sharp, 
1992) 129. 
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interest. The situation turned from crisis to tragedy within days of the 
announcements by the first two republics to secede. 
Between 1990 and 1991, the media showed a limited amount of interest 
in the situation in the former Yugoslavia.  During this period over eighty 
articles were printed in the mainstream U.S. magazines and journals with 
regard to the situation in Croatia and Slovenia.73 When Serbia attacked 
Slovenia and Croatia a day after their declarations of independence, the news 
media reported it as a "civil war." Taking their cue from Slobodan Milosevic, 
the media also spoke of "ancient ethnic hatreds" as if they were the sole cause 
of conflict in the Balkans. The civil war label was predominant in the media 
throughout the next two years and the ancient hatred theory came up 
frequently in Congress, the State Department and at the White House. Thus 
the stage was set for public debate over U.S. interests in a faraway land caught 
up in a "civil war" caused by "ancient ethnic hatreds." When in reality, the 
theme of democracy, human rights, and international law was at stake in the 
former Yugoslav republics. However, public debate was still not developed 
during the Croatian phase of the war. The U.S. government chose not to 
address the issue unless provoked and only a handful of Congressmen were 
interested in pursuing more information. The public debate did not heat up 
until the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in April 
1992—when the real crisis began. 
73See the Readers Guide of Periodicals for articles written between January 1990-December 
1991 in Time; Newsweek: McClean's; U.S. News and World Report: UN Chronicle; The Nation; 
World Press Review; PeopleWeeklv; National Review: Commentary: The Atlantic Monthly; 
Forbes: The American Spectater; The New Yorker and: Commonwealth. 
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V. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
It was as if the God of War had sought out the unhappy people 
and called them to a day of judgement when their souls were 
laid bare to show to all the world the Olympian heights of virtue 
and the foulest cesspools of degradation of which mankind is 
capable.74 
Historian Muriel Heppell's above description of Yugoslavia during 
WWII, can easily be applied to the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The suffering and humiliation experienced during the tragedy of WWII and 
the Civil War is being repeated. The origins of conflict in Yugoslavia during 
WWII and the Civil War had little to do with ethnic differences, however, 
ethnicity was, indeed exploited to rouse the masses into fighting. The fact 
that the South Slav people speak the same language and by all outward 
appearances are of the same ethnic background was disregarded once the 
people separated themselves into Croatian and Serbian camps.  The "long 
peace"-to quote John Lewis Gaddis's description of the Cold War-allowed 
time to hide and perhaps, dull the pain of this period and the Yugoslavs lived 
side by side-regardless of ethno-religious differences~for over forty years. 
However, once again, the tools of ancient hatred and ethnic differences have 
been recollected to incite the masses into another bloody and fratrical war in 
the Balkans. 
A. PERCEPTIONS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE 
The White House made it clear that the initiative in responding to the 
events ocurring in the Balkans during the Croatian phase of the war would 
go to the Europeans.  By the time the war reached Bosnia-Herzegovina, this 
74Muriel Heppell and Frank B. Singleton, Yugoslavia, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961) 
171. 
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position had not changed. It did, however, begin to gradually shift more 
toward involvement as the public debate grew over the following year. As 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina quickly reached unimaginable levels of 
tragedy, public debate began to place pressure on the U.S. government. 
However, due to the esoteric nature of Balkan politics, this debate took 
some time to develop, which gave the Bush administration time to reassess 
their previous policy of non-intervention.  It was not until the debate moved 
from Balkan politics to the simple argument of humanitarian intervention 
that the U.S. government started to act. 
Public debate over the Bosnian phase of the current war in the former 
Yugoslavia shifted from an emphasis on historic "ancient hatreds" and 
focused more on the humanitarian tragedy which unfolded. 
When Germany decided to recoginize Croatia and Slovenia in 
December 1991, the U.S. "showed concern" and refused to support Germany's 
move.75   The Bush administration held firm to this position even after all 
twelve members of the European Community, Austria and Switzerland 
recognized the independence of the two republics. President Bush asserted 
that recognition by the U.S. would come only after a peace settlement was 
reached and human rights issues were resolved in Croatia. 
In January 1992, the Soviet Union officially broke apart and Yugoslavia 
was well on its way to total collapse. U.S. attention was fixed on providing 
aid to Moscow in order to bolster its disastrous economy. The U.S.'s 
Russocentric policies were focused on supporting President Boris Yeltsin due 
to a general fear of centrist and nationalist parties taking over and 
75The New York Times. (7 January 1992). 
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reconstituting the Soviet Union. The fighting in Croatia and Slovenia was 
not addressed by the Bush administration, who preferred to leave it to the 
European Community to handle until war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out 
in April 1992. 
Public debate over the Yugoslav crisis entered a new phase when 
Bosnia-Herzegovina became embroiled in war.  Rumors of mass killings and 
prison camps began to circulate among State Department officials and 
Congressmen between April and July 1992, concerning these allegations. 
However, there was not an official statement from the White House until 
August. 
After a year of wishing that the former Yugoslavia would remain 
intact—similar to the wishes for an intact Soviet Union~the Bush 
administration finally conceded to the recognition of the break-away republics 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia in April 1992.  The spread of 
war to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the blatant display of armed aggression 
against civilians moved the Bush administration to confront a demanding 
American public. Congressional hearings and debates, coupled with a greater 
interest in the media forced the Yugoslav crisis in front of a reluctant White 
House. 
1. Decision-Making Time at the White House 
One month after the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the 
international community, a whirlwind of events shook the Bush 
administration-and the world.  George Kenney, State Department Yugoslav 
Desk Officer, introduced the term "ethnic cleansing" into mainstream 
America.  War had reached Bosnia-Herzegovina in full scale and the JNA, led 
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by General Ratko Mladic-known as the "Butcher of Belgrade"-- began 
destroying all military production facilities, airports and infrastructure 
leading to the captital Sarajevo. Rumors of atrocities and prison camps were 
also circulated through the State Department corridors, however, none were 
confirmed. George Kenney had on several occaisions called for a team of 
State Department foreign service officers to investigate and confirm these 
reports, however, his requests fell on deaf ears. The media, Congress and 
human rights groups, however, began hear of the growing tragedy, placing 
even more pressure on the Bush administration to become involved. 
2. The Diplomatic and Humanitarian Course 
As a result of growing pressure from the developing public debate, the 
Bush administration began taking a series of actions—however cautious— 
toward involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   A call for humanitarian 
intervention replaced Bush's realpolitik approach toward the former 
Yugoslavia. The first step was the suspension of landing rights for the 
Yugoslav National Airlines, followed by the initiation of diplomatic 
sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. The U.S. also initiated discussions at 
the UN on Chapter VII sanctions. Secretary Baker stated in Lisbon that 
"before we consider force, we ought to exhaust all of the political, diplomatic, 
and economic remedies that might be at hand."76 In addition to the 
sanctions, the U.S. pledged a nine million dollar contribution to assist 
refugees  in Bosnia-Herzegovina and authorized the airlift of humanitarian 
aid. 
76See U.S. Department of State Dispatch. (September 1992) vol.3 for chronology of statements 
and actions taken by the U.S. in response to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Later in May 1992, a Serbian mortar landed in the middle of a bread 
queue in Sarajevo, killing a score of people.  Television images reached the 
American public and for the first time, the Bush administration had to 
reconsider its assessment of the conflict. The marketplace bombing thrust 
Bosnia into the heat of public debate and demanded attention.  The same day, 
a maternity hospital in Sarajevo was shelled and set ablaze, Sarajevo was 
under seige, and the Serbian army was identified as the aggressors. Following 
the marketplace bombing, the U.S. co-sponsored UN Resolution 757, which 
imposed economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.77 By May 21, 
the U.S. had withdrawn all military attaches from Belgrade and closed the 
Yugoslav consulate in New York. After a year of "hands off" policy toward 
the former Yugoslavia, the White House had to shed its realpolitik approach 
to the former Yugoslavia and put on its "neo-interventionist" coat in order to 
appease a moral American society—which was precisely what it had tried to 
avoid. 
At a Helsinki meeting of the CSCE in June, President Bush made it 
plain that America was not thinking of using military force to stop the 
conflict in Bosnia.   The Europeans supported Bush's statement—themselves 
not wishing to become involved in another international military evolution 
so soon after Desert Storm.    Action was, however not entirely absent. 
The year 1992 was a complex one for the Bush administration.  The 
Soviet Union had collapsed, the economy was plummeting, Europe was 
77UN Resolution 757 also imposed the freezing of assets abroad, trade sanctions, the 
prohibition of services related to aircraft and weapons, the prohibition of air traffic, the 
reduction of diplomatic staff, a ban on participation in official cultural and sporting events, and 
suspension of scientific and technical cooperation. 
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integrating and, above all, it was an election year. Politically, there was much 
at stake and Bosnia could barely be squeezed onto such a full plate. 
B. THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
The World Community was divided and confused over what action to 
take in the former Yugoslavia~if any. The UN was the obvious and most 
legitimate choice to lead in the search for peace in the Balkans, but lacked the 
military power and money to enforce any action. The EC, the WEU, and the 
CSCE were all anxious to provide a forum for debate and discussion-- 
however, action came slowly, if at all. NATO was the only organization 
strong enough to intervene decisively.  However, the members of NATO 
could not reach an agreement.  The U.S. was unwilling to man or back an 
intervention force.  Without the U.S. military, a NATO coalition would not 
have the credibility and strength it needed to support any type of operation in 
the Balkans short of UN-backed NATO peacekeepers. As a result, the only 
decisive action by the U.S. government with regard to Bosnia, was to call for 
more conferences, tighten sanctions and publicly condemn the aggressors. 
But, public condemnation without the threat of American military might 
proved entirely ineffective in the face of "ethnic cleansing" by the JNA. 
The world community could not stop the war in the former 
Yugoslavia, however, the one thing they could not ignore was the flood of 
refugees entering Europe. Therefore, by February 1992, the Europeans, 
anxious to end the overwhelming flow of refugees, pushed the UN Security 
Council to vote unanimously to send 14,000 peacekeeers to Yugoslavia to 
monitor a cease-fire and protect minority Serbs in Croatia. This was the first 
tangible activity by the world community with regard to the Yugoslav crisis. 
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1. UN Diplomatic Actions 
There was a loud cry for UN peacekeeping forces during this period, 
although the fighting parties were not yet committed to holding a ceasefire- 
hence there was no peace to keep. The UN imposed a series of Security 
Council resolutions as the first proactive step towards ending the war in the 
former Yugoslav republics.  By May 1992, the UN announced nine 
resolutions toward the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The strongest of 
these included Resolutions 713 and 757, which established the arms embargo 
on all of the states of the former Yugoslav republics and applied specific 
economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. 
2. Operation Sharp Guard 
As a result of the UN Security Council resolutions, NATO began "Operation 
Maritime Monitor" in the Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargo and sanctions. 
Initially composed of naval warships from eight NATO nations, in the 
STANAVFORMED fleet, their mission was to challenge all inbound 
merchant ships regarding their cargoes and destinations.78   The U.S. and the 
Europeans sent naval vessels and reconnaissance aircraft to the Adriatic as 
the first step towards monitoring the UN's trade and arms embargo of Serbia. 
The operation was later changed to "Sharp Guard" and continues to prevent 
shipping from the Adriatic into the former Yugoslavia.  This gesture proved 
successful from the perspective of entrance by way of the Adriatic Sea. There 
were, however, several over-land entrances into Serbia, which served well to 
supply arms and supplies to the well-stocked JNA from the north and east. 
78For more information on the STANAVFORDMED fleet and Operation Maritime Monitor, see 
J.M. Boorda, Admiral, U.S. Navy, "Loyal Partner-NATO's Forces in Support of the United 
Nations," NATO's Sixteen Nations, (vol 1, 1994) 8-12. 
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The naval blocade at least provided some show of force—appeasing Congress 
and the American publice~and made life somewhat more difficult for the 
Serbs. 
In January 1992, former secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, acting as a 
special U.N. envoy, requested 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers for immediate 
placement in war-torn Croatia. At that time over 10,000 people had been 
killed and one third of Croatia had been seized. It was clear that Bosnia was 
the next target for Serbia. However, the UN was unwilling to divert the 
peacekeepers from Croatia into Sarajevo until after the marketplace bombing. 
3. The Group of Seven (G-7) 
At a follow-up meeting in Munich in July 1992, the Group of Seven (G- 
7), composed of representatives from the seven most industrialized and 
developed nations, discussed as the last item on their agenda, the economic 
and political ramifications of the war in Bosnia.  Results of the discussions 
were to implement economic sanctions in accordance with UN Resolution 
757, "condemn Serbian aggressors," and "support" negotiations by Lord 
Carrington and the EC. They concluded by promising to consider the use of 
military force to ensure the delivery of food to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As he 
was leaving town after the summit had ended, President Bush was quoted as 
saying: "I don't think anybody suggests that if there is a hiccup here or there 
or a conflict here or there that the United States is going to send troops."79 
The "hiccup" he was referring to had at that point been responsible for the 
deaths of over 100,000 people, mostly civilians and the systematic rape of tens 
of thousands of Muslim women. The Serbs were reassured by the G-7 and 
79Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993) xvii. 
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President Bush's statement that "condemning" the JNA and "supporting" 
negotiations-without the formidable U.S. military-would be the extent of 
western protestation. 
C CONGRESSIONAL AND SENATE DEBATES 
Congressional activity increased dramatically after Bosnia-Herzegovina 
declared their independence in April 1992.  Between April and July, there 
were over fifty statements made in Congress regarding the war in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
On May 11,1992, a Congressional hearing took place with the CSCE to 
hear the testimony of Dr. Silajdzic, the Foreign Minister of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Dr. Haris Silajdzic presented an emotional plea for support to 
the U.S. Congress on behalf of his newly independent country.  Chariman 
Hoyer and Co-Chariman DeConcini presented the citizens of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina as victims of "armed aggression" and "unspeakable atrocities" 
committed by the Serbian military and urged the CSCE to press the U.S. for 
stronger action to counter the violations of the CSCE principles made by 
Serbia.80 
By July 1992, Congressional involvement with the crisis in Bosnia was 
still limited to the handful of representatives, mostly affiliated with the CSCE. 
Senator Bob Dole, spoke frequently about rumors of concentrations camps 
and atrocities and pleaded for government support in investigating these 
allegations.  Senator Byrd, on the other hand, stated that "It's the European 
Community's problem.  It's not our job to be policeman.  It will cost too 
^See Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Hearing before the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 102d Congress, Second Session, "The Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina," May 
12,1992. 
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much." He added that the $400 billion U.S. deficit could not handle another 
$60 billion to intervene in a war borne of "ancient hatreds."81 
D. THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC REACTION TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
The fighting in Croatia was reported by the media on an occaisional 
basis and was referred to as a civil war by most journalists between 1991 and 
1992.   However, it was not until war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
atrocities were revealed that the media became more active. This is not to say 
that there was not a serious and devoted effort by journalists and foreign 
service personnel in the field between 1991 and 1992. By January 1992, 
twenty-two journalist had been killed in Yugoslavia during the previous 
seven months. 
Between January and March, news reports began to trickle into The 
New York Times  which revealded atrocities far greater than had previously 
been reported in Croatia. However, actual CNN film footage of dead and 
dying civilians had not been introduced to the American public yet. 
Mainstream news magazines and journals were not interested in the 
Yugoslav conflict yet either. There were only a handful of articles and 
editorials written in the mainstream magazines between June 1991 and April 
1992. 
However, once the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in April, the 
news media erupted with numerous front page articles and television 
coverage.  Time  magazine, one of the most widespread mainstream 
magazines in the U.S. provided a cover article on June 8, 1992 which 
described the bloodshed in the Sarajevo marketplace and maternity hospital. 
81See Congressional Records, August 11,1992, for full text of Senator Byrd's statements on 
Bosnia. 
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It also described the methods used by the Serbian military to "ethnically 
cleanse" Bosnia-Herzegovina of all Muslim residents and used comparisons 
to Hitler and the "final solution" of the Jewish population in Europe.82 This 
type of reporting was repeated in most all the other mainstream journals and 
magazines in the U.S. 
One of the key powers held by the media is that, through language, it 
was able to produce the impression that the war in the former Yugoslavia is a 
"civil war" born of "ancient hatreds," "ultra-nationalism" and "blood feuds." 
The simplification of the war was underscored by the President and Secretary 
of State's acceptance and use of the media's language.  Milosevic would have 
the world believe this to be true since the use of ancient hatreds, nationalism 
and civil war was precisely what he used to inspire his troops to fight for a 
Greater Serbia.  In reality, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
already declared their independence by the time Serbia launched its attacks. 
The debate over the crisis in the former Yugoslavia evolved from 
discussions of ancient hatreds, ethnic strife and civil war to that of the 
support of struggling new democracies in the post-Cold War and finally to 
that of basic humanitarian aid and moral obligations. The atrocities reported 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the televised aftermath of the marketplace 
bombing incited the public debate in the U.S. to call for action at various 
levels.  Air strikes were not supported when the conflict was considered a 
civil war between ancient ethnic rivals, however, when terms like "ethnic 
cleansing" were bantered about, the public became more willing to flex U.S. 
power in the name of humanitarian intervention. 
82Jill Smolowe, "Land of the Slaughter," Time. (June 8, 1992) 32-37. 
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E.  CONCLUSIONS 
...the United States should not seek to be the world's 
policeman...But in the wake of the Cold War, it is the 
role of the United States to marshal its moral and 
material rescues to promote a democratic peace. It is 
our responsibility-it is our opportunity~to lead. There 
is no one else.83 
Evidently, President Bush was not referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
when he spoke these words. The question one must now ask is, Why not 
Bosnia? The public debate over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina may have 
developed too late to force the the Bush administration into responding. It 
may have been a case of bad timing. 
It was not until August 1992 that the public debate reached a record 
peak. The Bush administration had to face important decisions only three 
months before elections when the media erupted with shattering news about 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina which launched the world back in time to 
WWII and the atrocious systematic killing of civilians during wartime. 
The Yugoslav crisis was indeed much more than a simple matter of 
"ethnic strife" in a "federal state" but, rather a coordinated attempt by Serbia 
and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army to carve a Greater Serbia out of the 
republics.  Furthermore, the religious divisions between Muslims, Orthodox 
and Catholics were kept at bay during the Tito years, which forbade religion 
under communism.  Also, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were of the 
secular sort and were not outwardly distinguishable from any of the other 
South Slavs in the former Yugoslavia.  The ethnic differences only became 
inflamed after Milosevic's successful media campaign which monopolized 
^George Bush, Address at the West Point Military Academy, West Point, New York, January 
5,1993. 
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every major newspaper and television station.   However, the powerful 
historical forces drove the Bosnian conflict deeper once it had started, while 
gaining strength with each day and with each town left "ethnically cleansed." 
By the summer of 1992, President Bush was preparing for the elections 
in November and was definitely not going to get the U.S. involved militarily- 
-or unilaterally~to solve the problem.  By the time the elections arrived and a 
new administration was later sworn in, Bosnia had been embroiled in ten 
months of war and "ethnic cleansing."  The push for action was coming from 
many different angles, however, none of them powerful or loud enough to 
force a committment.   Even after the Clinton administration had time to 
settle into the White House-a year and a half into the war in Bosnia- 




The war in Bosnia escalated dramatically between April and August of 
1992. U.S. foreign policy efforts were minimal and action was clearly 
delegated to the Europeans. Public debate over the war emerged during the 
extraordinary release of information on August 2, 1992 that something was 
happening in Bosnia on a much grander and more horrifying scale than the 
American public could have imagined. Still euphemistically referred to as a 
"conflict" the situation was marked by reports of mass execution of civilians, 
concentration camps, rape camps, emolations, and the forced removal of tens 
of thousands of people on the basis of religious orientation. The "ancient 
hatreds" focused was replaced by grave humanitarian concerns in within the 
public debate. 
A. THE MEDIA EXPLOSION 
The phrase "ethnic-cleansing", which referred to the systematic killing 
and removal of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was first introduced by 
former State Department Yugoslav Desk Officer, George Kenney on 14 May 
1992.84 state Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler used the expression 
at the noon briefing that day. A few Congressmen got wind of this term and 
repeated it during Congressional debates and hearings. It was even 
mentioned in The New York Times  a few times between May and July. 
However, widespread use of the term and its analogy to genocide did not 
occur until 2 August of the same year. Journalist Roy Gutman wrote an 
^George Kenny is a former State Department Foreign Service Officer, who resigned in 
September 1992 to protest U.S. government policy in the former Yugoslavia. Kenney, who 
served as the Yugoslav desk officer at State, spoke daily with U.S. Foreign Service Officer 
Henry Kelley, based in Belgrade, who introduced the term "ethnic cleansing" to Kenney. The 
term was used by the Bosnian Serbs when describing the systematic removal any non-Serbian 
residents from Bosnia-Herzegovina through annihilation or forced removal. 
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article for New York's Newsday  revealing the existence of concentration 
camps or -"death camps" as he referred to them--in Serbia.85 This statement 
was indeed a groundbreaking article which disclosed to the world the gravity 
of the situation in Bosnia.  Although there was no significant reaction from 
the U.S. government after Gutman's report, the spokesman for the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sylvana Foa, stated that Gutman's 
article was directly related to saving at least 6,000 Bosnian Muslims from 
certain imprisonment and possibly from death.  In fact, within weeks the 
Serbs moved some of the prison camps deeper into Serbian-held territory and 
released thousands of prisoners.86   The existence of the concentration camps 
and the multitude of atrocities being committed in Bosnia became world 
news and common knowledge to the mass public in the U.S. by the end of 
August 1992. 
1. Public Debate Refocuses on Humanitarian Issue 
After Gutman's article was published, over 100 articles were published 
in mainstream American magazines87—between August and December 1992— 
which discussed the matter of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.   Furthermore, 
during the month of August alone, there were over 110 speeches made in the 
Congress and the Senate which discussed ethnic cleansing, genocide, 
humanitarian aid, military intervention and diplomatic involvement by the 
U.S. 
^Roy Gutman was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his reportings on the Yugoslav crisis from 
1990-1993. Compilations of his articles are published in his book, A Witness to Genocide 
(1993). 
86Sherri Ricchiardi/'Exposing Genocide...For What?" Interview with Roy Gutman in 
American Journalism Review (June 1993) 32-37. 
87Mainstream American magazines were researched in Reader's Guide to Periodicals. Included 
were, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, McClean's, The Nation, National 
Review, The New York Review of Books and Washington Monthly. 
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In today's world of spy satellites, early warning systems, and high 
technolgy communications systems, the "Nazi Final Solution" would seem 
impossible to perpetuate. Although the news media was first to publicize the 
depth of the atrocities being committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. 
government had been informed of them long before August.  However, the 
government, for various reasons discussed in this chapter, did not seek to 
validate their suspicions earlier in the conflict.  After Gutman's article came 
out, the public debate over intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina increased 
dramatically and the U.S. government had no choice but to become more 
involved. 
B. U.S. REACTIONS: SEE NO EVIL? 
Serbia has no powerful outside backers such as the Soviet Union 
in the past. It has up to now been enouraged by Western 
inaction, not least by explicit statements that force would 
not be used.88 
The day after the Gutman article was printed, the U.S. State 
Department issued a statement which was released by the Department 
spokesman, Richard Boucher.  In the statement, the department 
acknowledged the existence of detention centers in Bosnia and Boucher stated 
that "our own reports, information similar to press reports," made it clear 
that "Serbian forces are maintaining what they call detention centers for 
Croatians and Muslims," and that "there have been abuses and torture and 
killings taking place in those areas." He went on to say that the Bush 
administration was "deeply concerned" and "condemned the actions."  But 
he also said that the U.S. had no plans for responding other than in offering 
^Leslie Gelb, "Bomb Serbia?" The New York Times, (6 August 1992). 
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to assist the International Red Cross in seeking to relieve the suffering of 
civilian victims involved.   He further asserted that the State Department 
believed that the atrocities were being committed on both sides and that there 
were allegations of mistreatment in Bosnian and Croatian detention centers 
as well.89 The following day, the Bush administration "backed away" from 
the assertion it made the previous day that Serbian forces were torturing and 
killing civilians at detention centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
said"there was little it could do immediately to investigate reports of 
atrocities." This time the statement was made by senior State Department 
official, Thomas M.T. Niles.  He stated that "We've not been able to have 
independent confirmation of these reports," although he did confirm that the 
camps did exist.90 
On August 5,1992, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger-- 
who had filled in for Baker who was working on Bush's presidential 
campaign at that time-announced additional U.S. actions, including a request 
for an emergency meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) 
to examine reports of alleged abuses in detention centers in Serbia and Bosni- 
Herzegovina and a request that the CSCE investigate these allegations. He 
also indicateed that the U.S. Was sending monitors to Romania to evaluate 
the effects of UN sanctions and was developing a reslution that would call on 
states to collect information on "war crimes" and transmit the information to 
the UN Security Council. 
89David Binder, "No U.S. Action Seen On Prison Camps," The New York Times (4 August 1992). 
90Clifford Krauss, "U.S. Backs Away From Charge of Serbian Abuses," The New York Times. (5 
August 1992). 
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The White House soon realized that the public debate could not be 
avoided and some type of action had to be announced. The sensational 
evidence presented in the Gutman article and its numerous followers 
prompted immediate reaction from the White House.  The American public- 
and the world-waited for President Bush to speak. 
1. U.S. Takes First Step Towards Diplomacy 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a complex, 
convoluted conflict that grows out of age-old 
animosities...century-old blood-feuds...bringing 
peace to the Balkans will take years of work.91 
This quote by President Bush described his administration's view 
toward the former Yugoslavia from the very beginning of the crisis. This 
view may not have changed, however, the administration could no longer 
hide behind it to justify non-intervention.  In response to the public debate 
over concentration camps and atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bush 
administration took the first steps toward diplomatic intervention since the 
war began.  Four days after the Gutman article, Bush announced that the U.S. 
was going to: 1) Support passage of a UN resolution to authorize all necessary 
measures to facilitate deliver of humanitarian aid; 2) Establish diplomatic 
relations with Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; 3) Enhance 
enforcement of sanctions against Serbia; 4) Push for the stationing of 
international monitors to prevent the conflict from widening; and 5) 
Intensify consultation with NATO on measures to assist the UN in the 
delivery of humanitarian aid92. This was one of the first signs of dedicated 
U.S. interest in the Yugoslav conflict.  Although, in reality, these assertions 
91
 Statement made by President George Bush on 6 August 1992 news conference. 
92Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Urges UN to Back Force to Get Aid Into Bosnia," The New York 
Times.(7 August 1992). 
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kept the American military completely uncommitted, it provided enough 
activity to satisfy the demands of American interventionists in Congress and 
Europe.  Over the next two years that committment slowly gained more 
support and strength through public debate. The next promising sign of U.S. 
involvement came with the London Conference later in the month. 
2. The London Conference--26-28 August 1992 
Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger attended the London 
Conference to discuss the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina with his European 
counterparts. This was the first time the U.S. participated directly in 
negotiations to find a settlement in the Balkans.   After denouncing Serbian 
aggression and describing their actions as "reckless," he stated:  "To be sure, 
we will not settle this conflict here today in London...What we will do, I hope, 
is to establish a coordinated, integrated, and ongoing process of negotiations 
which will culminate in a reversal of Serb aggression and the integration of 
the former Yugoslav republics in the wider framework of a democratic 
Europe."93   Eagleburger's forceful rhetoric accompanied his assertion that the 
U.S. was not going to involve itself militarily in trying to make peace and 
force the conflict to an end. However, his attendence was viewed as a 
positive sign by American interventionists and was especially welcomed by 
the Europeans. 
Despite the public cry for action after the Gutman article—followed by 
dozens more in the mainstream news media—the Bush administration did 
not come forth with an aggressive message at the London Conference. 
Eagelburger did not call for action to end the tragedy at the London 
93Lawrence Eagleburger, "Intervention at the London Conference on the Former yugoslavia,' 
U.S. Department of State Dispatch. (31 August 1992) Vol. 3, No. 35, p.673. 
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Conference but his presence was a first step toward American involvement. 
The Bush administration at that time had its full attention devoted to the 
upcoming Presidential elections.  Dramatic foreign policy initiatives which 
threatened to involve the U.S. military would have been risky to President 
Bush's campaign. 
C. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY INCREASES 
During the month of August 1992, over fifty-five Congressmen and 
Senators made statements at Congression Hearings concerning the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over forty percent of the statements were 
interventionist in tone, while less than twenty percent were adamantly 
opposed to U.S. military intervention-either diplomatic or military. 
However, all of the statements voiced grave concern over the humanitarian 
issue involved with the plight of the Bosnian Muslims.94 Fifteen of the 
Congressmen and Senators made comments for the first time regarding the 
war in the former Yugoslavia.  The humanitarian issue had touched on a 
sensitive nerve among those whose previous concerns were fixed on 
domestic issues. 
Congressional debate over what the U.S. should do with regard to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was at its peak during August-September 1992.  House 
Resolution 557 and Senate Resolution 330 were both aimed at U.S. 
intervention in:  lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims; 
providing humanitarian aid; initiating procedures for a war crimes tribunal; 
94See Congressional Records, 4,5,10,11,12, August 1992. 
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tightening sanctions against Serbia; and threatening the use of force against 
Serbia if the humanitarian relief efforts were blocked.95 
At the other end of the spectrum, a wide variety of non- 
interventionists in Congress, were vehemently opposed to any type of 
activity regarding the Balkans. Senator Byrd made a statement to the Senate 
which described the war in Bosnia by stating:   "it derived from ancient 
hatreds dating back to Kosovo and hence too complicated for the U.S.; it 
would not be fought as easily as the Gulf War; it would cost too much for the 
U.S. to intervene; it is the European Community's problem; the U.S. deficit 
could not handle another conflict overseas; and it is not the job of the U.S. to 
be the world's policeman."96  Other Senators and Respresentatives who sided 
with the same camp as Senator Byrd with statements to the Congress 
included:  Coats; Stevens; Warner; Hollings; Jeffords; and Gorton.97 
The recommendations presented at the Congressional Hearings on 
"War Crimes and the Humanitarian Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia"were 
originally presented by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in October 1992. The 
recommendations invoked what the Bush administration had hoped to 
avoid-Article I of the Genocide Convention.  The Committee urged that the 
U.S. and other UN members should take whatever immediate action is 
necessary to end the "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Even as late as January 1993, the Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees 
made a strong and compelling statement to Congress for "immediate and 
extraordinary steps to curb the genocide now occurring in Bosnia and to 
95See Congressional Records for Hearings on 11 and 25 August 1992 for full text of House 
Resolution 557 and Senate Resolution 330. 
96See Congressional Records on 11 August 1992, statement made by Senator Byrd. 
97See Congressional Records on 10 -11 August 1992 for text of statements. 
74 
protect those uprooted people whose lives are at serious risk."98 Senators 
Dole and Deconcini led the fight in Congress to pressure the White House for 
diplomatic and if necessary, military action to achieve peace in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and remain committed to this goal. 
D. THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
After the Bosnian phase of the war began in the former Yugoslavia, the 
world community turned to the U.S. for salvation.  The Europeans reassessed 
their previous desires to handle the crisis within the EC when the scope of 
the war became overwhelming. Several factors had affected Europe's view of 
the situation which included the massive flow of refugees, the threat of the 
war spreading to other countries in Europe, and most pressing, humanitarian 
nightmare that Bosnia-Herzegovina had become.   Memories of human 
tragedy ran deep with the Europeans, who fought two world wars on their 
soil. 
Four days after the Gutman article, Margaret Thatcher, former British 
Prime Minister wrote an essay for The New York Times  in order to strike a 
chord with President Bush and his administration. She described the Serbian 
"ethnic cleansing" policy as "a term for the expulsion of the non-Serb 
population that combines the barbarities of Hitler's and Stalin's policies 
toward other nations."99 The so-called Yugoslav crisis suddenly emerged into 
something much more serious.  Gutman's article opened the floodgates for 
the media and pulbic debate worldwide.  The shameful memories of Nazi 
98Statement of Roger P. Winter Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees on "Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Needs of Refugees and Displaced Persons in and Outside Bosnia and 
Hercegovina" before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki 
Commission) January 25,1993. 
"Margaret Thatcher, "Stop the Excuses." The New York Times, (6 Aug 1992). 
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concentration camps reopened the shameful wounds of Europeans who 
preached "Never Again" after it was all over.  This collective guilt of Europe 
was shared by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher her stabbing essay in 
The New York Times. 
The analogies made between ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the Jewish 
annihilation of WWII have been convincingly argued and analyzed by many 
European and American journalists and writers including:  Nobel prize 
winning Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel; Nazi hunter, Simon Wiesenthal; 
journalists Anthony Lewis, and Roy Gutman; and such political figures as 
Margaret Thatcher and Zbigniew Brzenski.   The New York Times  even 
quoted presidential candidate Bill Clinton on August 5,1992, two days after 
the Gutman article:  "If the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is 
the high cost of remaining silent and paralyzed in the face of genocide."100 
E. THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN TURMOIL 
After a year of working around the clock with the Gulf War, the State 
Department faced the war in Bosnia with mixed emotions.  The closest people 
to the problem were naturally the foreign service officers working on the 
Yugoslav and East European desks. Mr. George Kenney was the Yugoslav 
desk officer when Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence and war 
broke out.  Throughout the spring and summer of 1992, he maintained daily 
contact on the telephone or wire with his foreign service counterpart in 
Yugoslavia.  It was through his contacts in Belgrade that Kenney received the 
first information on the strategy of "ethnic cleansing" being used by the Serbs 
in early May 1992.  It was Kenney who introduced the term into the 
100Clifford Kraus, "U.S. Backs Off Report on Serbian Abuses," The New York Times, (5 Aug 
1992) Al. 
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international lexicon on May 14, 1992, by placing it in the draft of "guidance," 
the policy-approved material that the State Department spokesman-Margaret 
Tutwiler~used as the basis for public statements. Kenney sent a proposal 
through his superiors to send a State Department team over to the former 
Yugoslavia on a fact-finding mission.  This idea was immediately dismissed 
and Kenney had to continue to rely on cables from his Belgrade contacts. 
Despite the reports of atrocities and agression by the Serbs which Kenney 
provided his superiors on a daily basis, the Bush administration refused to 
take stronger steps toward halting the conflict-either with diplomatic or 
military pressure. The argument used by high level State officials was that 
the atrocities were being committed by both sides and President Bush still 
wished to let the Europeans handle it. Even after the Gutman article came 
out, the Bush administration refused to send a team of officials to confirm the 
reports of Serbian genocide in concentration camps.  Kenney affirmed that 
had it done so, there would have beeen a very compelling argument to 
invoke the UN Genocide Convention to act decisively to stop the Serbs.101 
On August 26, Kenney announced his resignation in order to protest 
the Bush administration's "ineffective" and "counterproductive" handling of 
the war in the former Yugoslavia.  Within the next year, two more 
government officials resigned also to protest the government's handling of 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.102 
The revelation of Gutman's article and the acts of resignation from the 
State Department moved the public debate over Bosnia-Herzegovina into a 
101George Kenney, former State Department Yugoslav Desk Officer, Washington D.C. 
interview by author, July 26,1994. 
102George Kenney, former State Department Yugoslav Desk Officer of Washington D.C, 
interview by author, May 20,1994. 
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new realm of reality for the U.S. government.   Heightened Congressional 
activity, State Department frustration, greater media interest, lobbying efforts 
and European anxiety gave the U.S. government a great deal to ponder 
during the 1992 election campaign. By January 1993, more Americans were 
willing to consider military intervention for humanitarian purposes than 
they had been nine months earlier.103 However, during the period 
November 1992-January 1993, the public debate was focused on the 
presidential election and the new administration.   The American public 
debate over Bosnia-Herzegovina was put on hold wait until the domestic 
dust settled after the new year and new administration in the White House. 
But the one million displaced Bosnian Muslims had already been waiting for 
nine months. 
103Gallup Poll conducted January 28-29 1993 found that 57 percent of Americans favoring using 
U.S. ground forces to restore peace and humanitarian aid in Bosnia and 63 percent favored using 
U.S. Aircraft to enforce the no-fly zone. 
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VII. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: 1993-PRESENT 
When President Clinton took office in January 1993, the war in Bosnia 
was ten months old and what was once known as Yugoslavia had been gone 
for almost two years. President Clinton faced the same issues and decisions 
which paralyzed the Bush administration:  1) What were the U.S. national 
interests?; 2) Is there a risk-free solution through diplomatic mediation?; 
3) Would the Europeans be able to handle the situation on their own?; and 4) 
Could U.S./NATO air strikes be used in a limited way, without dragging the 
U.S. into a ground war? The campaign rhetoric used by President Clinton the 
year before was filled with humanitarian and interventionist undertones and 
used to attack President Bush's realpolitik approach, which called for non- 
intervention.   However, when the Clinton administration faced the decision 
between intervention and isolation, the decision was complicated by the 
humanitarian aspect of the public debate. Nevertheless, the Clinton team did 
not address either specific actions or the desire to remain uninvolved in the 
war in Bosnia until after they attempted to garner support for their campaign- 
promises in health care, lifting the ban on homosexuals in the armed forces, 
and slashing the defense budget. In the final analysis, both administrations 
achieved the same results, which was humanitarian support—at arms length— 
and, ultimately a kind of non-intervention. 
This chapter analyzes the public debate over the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina during the first year of President Clinton's administration. 
Throughout 1993 and certainly by the end of the year, the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina became old news and relegated behind the debate over health 
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care reform and the troubled economy in the U.S.104 Public debate over 
Bosnia, however, remained constant in Congress and among the various 
international humanitarian organizations.  Labeling the war as:   Civil; tribal; 
ethnic; religious; or ancient was no longer a primary focus of debate.   The war 
was now, in 1993-1994, framed by the public debate as a humanitarian 
situation. The humanitarian impact of the war on the Europeans had begun 
to wear on those states who were taking in the flood of close to one and a half 
million refugees.105  The pressure for U.S. intervention now came from the 
Europeans, who realized after two years, that they could not go it alone. 
A. CLINTON'S FIRST YEAR: RHETORIC OR ACTION? 
By the time the Clinton administration took over the White House, 
the public debate over the war in the former Yugoslavia had evolved into a 
new stage. It was no longer thought of purely in terms of a "civil war" or a 
fight for post-Cold War democracy.  The humanitarian aspect of the war 
became the most pronounced feature addressed by the American public. 
During February 1993, President Clinton was in the midst of a major 
change in military policy and structure. He forced the Pentagon to take steps 
to overturn the ban on homosexuals in the military and forced the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to cut ten billion dollars more from the military budget 
than proposed by Bush. President Clinton, was, therefore not in a strong 
position during the month of February to ask the military to get involved in 
l°4This is based on the number of front page New York Times articles covering the war in 
Bosnia. During 1992 there were one-hundred twelve front-page articles and in 1993, there were 
only. 
105United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statistic as of December 1993. 
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Bosnia-which was also opposed by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the 
JCS and Rear Admiral Mike W. Cramer, top intelligence official on the JCS.106 
The Clinton Administration refused to support the Vance Owen plan 
in a statement made by George Stephenopoulos, White House spokesman on 
3 February 1993. He stated that the President was working on "his own 
approach" which would be unveiled "relatively soon."107 He referred to the 
Vance-Owen plan as a flawed initiative which gave too much territory to the 
Serbs, which would be unacceptable to the Muslims. The Clinton 
administration was also willing to work with Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance 
and the Balkan parties in negotiating a new plan that would not leave the 
Bosnian Muslims at such a severe disadvantage.  President Clinton stated 
specifically that he was "reluctant to impose an agreement on the parties to 
which they do not agree...and cannot be enforced internally."108 
The Clinton administration issued several statements during their first 
year in office regarding the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many of the 
statements gave the impression of action and initiative, however, upon 
further analysis, the so-called proposals proved to be more rhetorical than 
substantial.  Furthermore, U.S. foreign policy in the former Yugoslavia was 
not articulated by the President himself, but rather, by either the Secretary of 
State or State Department spokesmen. 
10
*Ibid. 
107Thomas Friedman, "U.S. Will Not Push Muslims to Accept Peace Plan," The New York 
Times. (2 February 1993). 
108Gwen Hji^ "Clinton and Mulroney Fault Balkan Peace Plan," The New York Times. (6 
February 1993). 
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B. CLINTON'S INNER CIRCLE 
Unlike his predecessors, President Clinton's inner circle of foreign 
affairs advisors were not as outspoken and bold when it came to foreign 
policy. The attitude of the White House towards the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina during 1993 had to be pieced together from State Department 
briefings and the occasional official statement made by Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher.   President Clinton's statements usually consisted of 
broad rhetorical strokes denouncing the "ethnic cleansing" and tragic state of 
the Bosnian people. In an effort to appear as if action might be considered by 
the administration, a few non-committing initiatives were announced now 
and then. 
1. The "Six Step" Approach 
On February 10, Warren Christopher, Secretary of State announced 
President Clinton's "Six-Step Approach" with regard to the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.  He asserted that the U.S. national interest in Bosnia lay in the 
fact that "We are committed to Europe's stability.  Our values and interests 
give us reason to help create an international standard for the fair treatment 
of minorities.  Therefore, we have reasons to participate actively in this 
effort."109 The six steps proposed by the Clinton administration included:  1) 
Direct and active U.S. participation in the Vance-Owen negotiations; 2) 
Pressure on the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats in the negotiations and craft a 
workable solution as opposed to imposing a settlement; 3) Tighten the 
enforcement of economic sanctions, increase political pressure on Serbia and 
l°9Warren Christopher, "New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In The Former Yugoslavia," 
Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC, February 10,1993, U.S. Department 
of State Dispatch, (15 February 1993). 
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deter Serbia from widening the war; 4) Enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia 
under a new UN resolution and further actions to promote delivery of aid; 5) 
Help implement and enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties; 
and 6) Consult widely with friends and allies on the above actions.110 The 
word "actions" was used to describe Clinton's steps, however, the only 
immediate action actually taken was the tightening of economic sanctions 
against Serbia and Montenegro in April 1993.111 
2. The Joint Action Plan 
In May 1993, Secretary Christopher announced the details of a "Joint 
Action Program" of steps designed to end the bloodshed in Bosnia. The 
members of the action committee included the members of the UN Security 
Council—French Foreign Minister Juppe, United Kingdom Foreign secretary 
Hurd, Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, 
and U.S. Secretary of State Christopher. The plan consisted of ten major 
points which focused on:   humanitarian assistance; strengthening sanctions; 
sealing borders; protecting designated "safe areas"; enforcing no-fly zones; 
establishing war crimes tribunals; implementing a durable peace; stopping the 
policy of "ethnic cleansing;" and containing the fighting.112 
3. Use of Force Considered 
As a result of the humanitarian disaster in Bosnia, by July, the State 
Department indicated a change in attitude towards the use of force to support 
110Warren Christopher, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, (April 5, 1993). 
111See full text of President Clinton's letter sent to the Congress, released by the White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, April 26,1993 as printed in U.S. Department of 
State  Dispatch. (May 3, 1993). 
112Warren Christopher, "Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia," 
Opening statement at a joint news conference, Washington, DC, May 22,1993. U.S. Department 
of State Dispatch. (May 24, 1993). 
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humanitarian relief, which inferred a desire to work with the European 
Community and the UN for possible multi-lateral military intervention. 
Michael McCurry, State Department spokesman announced, "We're 
discussing with our allies how best to support the peace negotiations that are 
under way in Geneva and how to alleviate the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation ..."  This announcement also endorsed the considerations of the 
possible use of air strikes to support humanitarian missions to Bosnia, but 
not for the purpose of rolling back the Serbian gains or to try to "turn the 
tide in the bitter fighting."113 
In contrast to McCurry's statements, which took on a decisive and 
active tone, Warren Christopher made statements which indicated that the 
U.S. would not act in Bosnia until the Europeans did. Christopher called 
Bosnia, "the world's most difficult diplomatic problem," but added, "The 
United States is doing all that it can consistent with our national interest." 
These statements came after Christopher's trip to Europe, which was made to 
press the Europeans into accepting a full-blown "American plan of action", 
which called for arming the Bosnian Muslims to end the then sixteen- 
month-old war.   Christopher returned to American without the European 
agreement which was not followed up with any further approach by the 
administration or the President.114 
C THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION 
The "ethnic-cleansing" campaign in Bosnia was widely publicized in 
the U.S. between August 1992 and July 1993. This changed the public debate 
113Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Weighs Wider Role for Bosnian Air Strikes," The New York 
Times. (30 July 1993). 
114Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Won't Act in Bosnia Until the Europeans Do," The New York Times. 
(22 July 1993). 
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by altering the view of the situation from one of a "civil war" being waged 
between two distinct factions to one of a clearly defined aggressor committing 
genocide against a clearly defined victim. During the first year of the Clinton 
administration, the war in Bosnia was discussed over 148 times on the front 
page of The New York Times, over 210 times in featured articles in 
mainstream news magazines and journals, and over 100 times in 
Congressional debates. Over ninety percent of the articles and statements 
referred to the humanitarian and "ethnic cleansing" aspect of the war, while a 
mere ten percent spoke of democracy, ancient hatreds, or civil war. 
D. THE WORLD COMMUNITY DIVIDED 
The world community remained divided over the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina throughout the year 1993. Despite the Vance-Owen plan, 
economic sanctions, arms embargo and the UN Protection Force, a solution 
to the Balkan problem was nowhere in sight by the end of the year. All the 
above mentioned efforts—however noble and individually sound— were 
missing the key element of strong and credible leadership.  Although the 
European Community initially indicated a willingness to handle the Balkan 
crisis, both Presidents Clinton and Bush, as leaders of the only remaining 
superpower in the world, received pressure to take the role of leader as time 
went by and the crisis developed. 
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1.  "Never Again?" 
...everyone today is retroactively "Churchillian." We 
retroactively condemn Neville Chamberlain for his 
appeasement, we laud Churchill for his foresight 
and his courage in making truly difficult choices in 
the face of evil.115 
Zbigniew Brezinski evoked the ghosts of the Nazi Holocaust in his 
essay in The New York Times  in April 1993 to protest U.S. inaction.    Similar 
criticisms of the world community-namely Western powers-came from 
Winston S. Churchill, grandson of WWII British Prime Minister, and 
Conservative member of Parliament.   Both Brezinski and Churchill advised 
the West to bomb Serbia and arm the Muslims.  Many others, including, 
Margaret Thatcher, George Schultz, Elie Wiesel, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Albert 
Wohlstetter, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan,116 the late Richard Nixon, and 
Henry Kissinger also agreed that this was the wisest course of action in the 
spring of 1993. 
The change in the public debate and attitude toward the Bosnian 
situation to a humanitarian framework forced the Clinton administration to 
reassess its options and interests in Bosnia. Taking his cue from General 
Colin Powell, who offered the same opinion to President Bush, Clinton was 
convinced that the only unilateral military option available to him entailed a 
massive deployment of ground forces to impose a permanent peace.  Clinton 
was not ready to call for this action. However, prompted by public pressure 
115Zbigniew Brzezinski, '"Never Again'—Except for Bosnia,"  The New York Times, (22 April 
1993). 
116An open letter to President Clinton and Other Western Heads of State was published in 
World Affairs, (Fall 1993) urging Western governments to intervene in Bosnia to end the ethnic 
cleansing and stem Serbian aggression. Western military force was particularly called for to 
indicate to aggressors such as the Serbs that attacks on members of the United Nations will not 
be tolerated. 
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concerning the humanitarian tragedy, he was willing to call upon the 
international community to push for a wider role in protecting humanitarian 
relief missions with the possible use of air strikes.  Meanwhile, throughout 
the remainder of 1993 and into 1994, the west debated over strategies and 
interests, while the ethnic cleansing campaign continued in full force 
throughout Bosnia. 
In addition to the lack of leadership in the world community, there 
was a lack of consensus over how to handle the crisis--and what organization 
was best suited to take action. The major force pushing European action was 
the influx of refugees into East-Central and Western Europe as well as the 
possible spread of the war into surrounding states. The U.S., however, did 
not articulate its national interests in the Balkan conflict until it became a 
humanitarian and moral issue—according to public debate. 
While the world community placed all its hopes on the Vance-Owen 
Plan, its success depended largely on U.S. support and the credibility of 
enforcement. The U.S. was unwilling, however, to support the plan as it was 
presented. 
2. Debate Over the Vance-Owen Plan 
International mediators in the UN and EC called for the U.S. to:  1) 
Support the use of NATO war planes to enforce the provisions of the 
proposed peace plan; 2) Provide satellite communications for the twenty-five 
thousand member UN peacekeeping force that would be sent if the Vance- 
Owen plan were to be imposed; and 3) Lead in the creation of a new 
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international court to try those accused of war crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia as well as a commission to monitor human rights issues.117 
Without the full weight of the U.S. behind the Vance-Owen plan , it 
had little chance of surviving.   The lack of U.S. support and President 
Clinton's criticism of the plan sent immediate signals to both the Serbs and 
Muslims in the former Yugoslavia that the West was divided over its 
attitudes towards the Balkans, which gave both parties little incentive to 
accept the plan. Statements made by the Clinton administration suggested 
that the Vance-Owen plan rewarded "ethnic cleansing" and "would invite 
further aggression and magnify the ethnic tensions with its division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten separate autonomous provinces with a weak 
central government."118   The plan was doomed thereafter. 
3. The United Nations 
The UN Security Council adopted resolutions 819, 824, and 836 in 1993 
in order to establish "safe areas"--also referred to as "safe havens"-- in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina where displaced Bosnians could reside until peace is established. 
These areas were also designated as humanitarian aid delivery centers which 
were to be protected by the UN peacekeeping force.119 The "safe areas", 
however, did not curb the "ethnic cleansing" campaign nor did it prevent the 
Serbs from attacking. All designated "safe areas" were attacked by mortar and 
tanks by the end of 1993. 
117Paul Lewis, "Balkan Mediators As U.S. Assent for NATO Planes to Keep Peace," The New 
York Times, (6 February 1993). 
118Friedman, (4 Feb 1993). 
119For text of UN Security Council resolution 836, see U.S. Department of State Dispatch. (June 
7,1993)/ 
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4. CSCE Activity Intensifies 
The CSCE remained extremely active throughout 1993 in speaking out 
against the war crimes and humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
However, without an enforcement arm, the brilliant ideas discussed during 
CSCE fora, merely get printed and filed into Congressional Records without a 
second thought. The influence of CSCE findings in the Helsinki 
Commissions to the Balkans played a tremendous role in educating and 
framing heated Congressional debate over intervention and isolation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In April 1993, the fourth congressional delegation to the Balkans was 
organized and visited Macedonia and Kosovo. Fear of the war spreading into 
these areas was a major issue among CSCE member-states and Macedonia and 
Kosovo were at the most imminent risk.  There were  also ten additional 
hearings held between January and October 1993 on the following aspects of 
the war: War Crimes and Humanitarian Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia; 
European Perspectives on the Bosnian Conflict; Systematic Rape and Forced 
impregnation of Bosnian Women; the Spillover Potential of the war into 
other regions; the Fate of Refugees; the Children of Sarajevo and more on 
Human Rights. 
E. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY 
Congressional debate over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina increased 
throughout the first year of the Clinton administration.  The handful of 
Congressmen and Senators who had been originally involved and well- 
educated in the political and historical events in the Balkans from the 
beginning of the war, continued, in full force, to push for action by the U.S. 
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government. They were followed in 1993 a gaggle of new faces during the 
Clinton administration, who had shown a sudden interest in the current war. 
However, most of the new faces were prompted either by the "ethnic 
cleansing" campaign and the possibility of constituents sending their sons to 
fight a war in a "faraway land in which we know nothing"~to again quote 
Neville Chamberlain. 
In January 1993, Congressmen Hoyer, McCloskey, and Smith presented 
House Resolution 35 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  It was then 
presented by Senators DeConcini, Dole, Lieberman, D'Amato, Lugar and 
Pressler~all veterans in the fight for Balkan foreign policy initiatives— which 
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.  The resolution called 
for U.S. action in assembling a multinational coalition to: 1) immediately 
enforce the UN "no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina; 2) ensure hat 
irregular forces in Bosnia either withdraw or be disbanded and disarmed or be 
subject to the use of military air force; 3) ensure the immediate, effective and 
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to all   civilians in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, through the use of force, if necessary; 4) ensure access to all 
camps, prisons and detention centers by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and other international humanitarian organizations and facilitate 
the release of all detainees; 5) seek an increase in the number of refugees from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina permitted to enter the U.S. and other European 
countries; 6) work to ensure that those responsible for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are held accountable by an international criminal tribunal; 
and 7 act, without delay, to uphold Bosnia-Herzegovina's right to self-defense 
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according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states the right to individual 
or collective defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state.120 
The provisions of House Resolution 35 and Senate Resolution 11 were 
printed in mainstream newspapers the following week in order to capture 
public support. Images of the concentration camps and civilian suffering on 
CNN and other forms of media in the U.S. had waned since August 1992 and 
the country was fixed on the newly elected president and his numerous 
domestic campaign promises.  However, Congressional activity continued 
with regard to the war in Bosnia throughout 1993. By the end of the year 
Congress had debated over what, if any action should be taken by the U.S.— 
either unilaterally or multi-laterally~in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   Meanwhile, 
the war raged on and the death toll mounted to over 200,000 and the number 
of refugees and missing persons surpassed 1.5 million. 
However, not all Congressmen agreed with intervention in Bosnia and 
spoke of "entangling alliances" and "Vietnam quagmires" rather than of 
democracy and human rights.  The debate over intervention and non- 
intervention was also not confined within partisan platforms.  There was an 
even mix of democrats and republicans supporting both views.  In April, 
Senator Jeffords, a Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee 
supported air strikes against Serbia, however stated, "We're all scared to death 
of public reaction to things that have a Vietnam overtone." Many 
Congressmen who were veterans of the Vietnam war also warned the public 
that fighting in Bosnia would be more comparable to Vietnam than to the 
Gulf War due to terrain and the nature of guerrilla warfare. Senator Leahy, a 
120See Congressional Records, 103d Congress, 1st Session, H.RES. 35, January 21,1993 and 
Senate Resolution 11, January 22,1993. 
91 
Democrat of Vermont, asserted that bombing the Serbs would not deter their 
aggression and, "The next move would have to be ground troops, " 
something he feared the American people were not ready for or willing to 
support. Senator McCain, a senior Republican member of the Armed Forces 
Committee, stated," I have yet to talk to a military expert who believes that air 
strikes alone will beneficially affect that tragic situation."121 
The debate in Congress also focused on whether the crisis in Bosnia is 
more resonant of the Holocaust or Vietnam.  This debate was evident in both 
parties and crossed old fault lines of the old doves and hawks. Senator Paul 
Simon asked the opponents of intervention, "What happens next if we do 
nothing?"   Senator Patrick Moynihan responded, "Another museum," a 
reference to the new Holocaust Museum in Washington.122 The moral 
outrage expressed by Congressmen continued throughout the remainder of 
the year— without achieving a consensus. 
The mixed Congressional debate over action in Bosnia compounded 
the Clinton administration's efforts to move decisively.  There was also the 
additional battle with Congress over Clinton's spending portion of the 
economic stimulus package, health care reform, the drastic cut in the military 
budget and the issue of homosexuals in the military. 
Regardless of the numerous issues which faced the new Clinton 
administration and the heated debates in Congress, a clearly defined foreign 
policy statement was not presented by the President with regard to the war in 
Bosnia.  The only official announcement of any sort came from the Secretary 
121Clifford Krauss, "Many in Congress Citing Vietnam, Oppose Attacks," The New York Times. 
(28 April 1993). 
122Ibid. 
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of State in April 1993. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, announced the 
Clinton administration's four strict guidelines for the use of force overseas: 
1) the goal must be stated clearly; 2) there must be a strong likelihood of 
success; 3) there must be "an exit strategy" and; 4) the action must win 
sustained public support.  However decisive this announcement may have 
been, it was not accompanied by a direct statement with regard to Bosnia and 
merely paved the way for non-intervention. 
The Clinton administration's failure to convey foreign policy in Bosnia 
gave the American public as well as the world community reason to worry. 
Some analysts assert that "it is better for a President to act ineptly than to fail 
to act at all."123   The examples used to illustrate this point showed that 
polling data during President Kennedy's term indicated that his popularity 
rose nearly as much following his dismal handling of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion as after his successful management of the Cuban missile crisis. 
President Ford's most popular days in office came after his decision to send in 
the marines to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez,  the American ship captured 
by Cambodian troops in 1975. The American public gave Ford high marks on 
his decisiveness and his defense of American honor, despite the ill conceived 
and poorly executed manner of the action taken.124 President Reagan's 
invasion of Grenada and President Bush's initiative in the Gulf War were 
also followed immediately by high poll ratings. Action in the former 
Yugoslavia has come in small spurts from the U.S. as well as the world 
community.  In the absence of decisive action and persuasion from the White 
123John F. Mueller, War. Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973) quoted in W. 
Lance Bennett, Public Opinion in American Politics. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc. 1980) 353. 
124Bennett, 354. 
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House, the American public and Congress was allowed the time to dwell on 
the subject of intervention on their own.   Meanwhile, the "ethnic cleansing" 
campaign continued while Bosnia-Herzegovina lost over two-thirds of its 
territory to Serbia. 
The public debate also also focused on the issue of genocide in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Since late 1992 and throughout the first year of the Clinton 
administration, pressure on the U.S. government mounted to make an 
unequivocal determination that the Serb campaign in Bosnia constitutes 
genocide under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.  External pressures from 
the media were accompanied by human rights organizations, American 
Jewish and Moslem advocacy groups, and prominent foreign policy experts. 
Richard Johnson, a former State Department official wrote an article which 
was presented to Congress stating that, "senior government officials know 
that Serb leaders are waging genocide in Bosnia, but will not say so in plain 
English because this would raise the pressures for U.S. action."125   Mr. 
Johnson, like Mr. Kenney and other State Department officials have spoken 
out to the public about their dismay over foreign policy in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in hopes of being more effective as individuals on the outside 
rather than watch from the frustrating point of view within the State 
Department. 
The in-fighting and strong differences of opinion among Congress, the 
White House, the State Department and public opinion have served to 
alienate the real situation at hand.   The Muslim population in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina began to lose hope for a western savior to rescue them from 
125See Richard Johnson, 'The Pin-Stripe Approach to Genocide," published in 1993 and printed 
in Congressional Records, on February 22,1994 as presented by Congressman Frank McCloskey. 
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Serbian aggression. They, therefore resumed their plea to end the arms 
embargo in order to defend themselves. The media—as well as some 
members of Congress—launched a campaign in mid-1993 to address the issue 
of lifting the embargo, but failed to create enough pressure to change policy. 
President Clinton is on record for supporting the lifting of the embargo, 
however, is not on record for placing pressure on the international 
community for doing so. He even stated in July 1993, that "the refusal of key 
European allies to approve his. proposal to end the fighting in Bosnia by 
arming the Bosnian Muslims created the current deteriorating situation, 
which could have been avoided."126   However, this statement was followed 
by Michael McCurry's statement the following day that the administration 
would not start a new effort in the Security Council to persuade the allies to 
lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government.127 Therefore, the 
administration was able to voice aggressive rhetoric without actually having 
to pursue any action. A unilateral lifting of the embargo would send the 
wrong signal about UN sanctions and embargoes, thereby undermining the 
only legitimate supranational organization capable of controlling some sense 
of international order in the world.  The U.S. government would not risk 
that possibility. Nevertheless, the debate over lifting the embargo continued 
within Congress, the media and the world community throughout the rest of 
1993. 
By the end of the year, however, there was a sharp decline in the 
number of front page news articles and cover stories on the war in Bosnia. 
Between October and December, The New York Times  only printed thirteen 
126Bill Clinton on CNN program "Larry King Live" July 20,1993. 
127Sciolino, 22 July 1993. 
95 
front page articles concerning the war in Bosnia.  During the first nine 
months of the Clinton administration, there were an average of fifteen front 
page articles per month. It had become old news, replaced by domestic 
worries, political scandals and health care reform. The ease in public debate at 
least took the pressure off of the government to intervene~at least until the 
next marketplace bombing. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
To get a clear picture of the future of U.S. foreign polciy, one must look 
at the evolution of public debate over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. An 
examination of Appendix A., shows that during the Croatian phase and 
initial Bosnian phase of the war, the "ancient hatreds" theory and stigma of 
civil war were predominant in public debate. This was also the period in 
which non-intervention was the prevailing opinion, disregarding 
humanitarian interests or concern for struggling democracies. 
Chapter II provided a brief description of the complex nature of Balkan 
history. The public debate focused on the "ancient hatreds" theory that the 
war in the former Yugoslavia was the result of centuries-old blood feuds and 
suppressed ethnic tensions.  However, the "Milosevic Factor" was completely 
ignored.  The media and U.S. government embraced the "ancient hatreds" 
theory as a way to avoid intervention. The war was considered too 
complicated. Memories of Vietnam were used to warn the public about 
potential quagmire situations. This theory was successfully applied during 
the Croatian phase of the war. 
However, public debate made a sharp turn in August 1992 after the 
Gutman article revealing Nazi-style concentration camps and "ethnic 
cleansing" opened the floodgates to the media and public interest. All of the 
actors involved in public debate over Bosnia immediately focused on the 
humanitarian tragedy.  The horrors of "ethnic cleansing" evoked memories 
of the Nazi annihilation of the Jews during WWII and the "Never Again" 
school of thought among Congressmen, the media, lobby groups and the 
American public. 
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This new focus not only stimulated public debate, but produced a 
swarm of new actors. Both professional and grassroots lobby groups came out 
in numbers to speak out about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Congressmen 
and Senators, who had previously contributed little, if anything to the debate 
over Bosnia, suddenly spoke up with emotional pleas for action.  And, of 
course, the media, flooded the public with front page and feature articles, as 
well as television coverage of the events in the Balkans. 
As a result of this heightened attention in the Balkans, the U.S. 
government had no choice but to respond in some way.  However, this 
response, while appearing to be interventionist, was extremely limited and 
piecemeal.  Chapter VII discussed the initiatives of the Clinton 
administration, which served to appease the American public, while keeping 
a safe distance from Balkan affairs. 
The humanitarian air drops provided the Bosnian Muslims a sense of 
hope. However, the war continued to drag on for another year. The debate 
over intervention, however began to heighten when the "ethnic cleansing" 
campaign did not abate during 1993. Congress, the CSCE, and several lobby 
groups also called for the world community to lift the arms embargo. 
Although President Clinton frequently suggested this tactic, the world 
community refused to arm the Muslims.   The Clinton administration also 
refused to lift the embargo unilaterally. 
During 1993, the public debate continued to progress, however, still 
focused on the humanitarian aspect of the war in Bosnia.  The "ancient 
hatreds" theory was no longer brought up as frequently as it had been during 
the initial phase of the war.  The debate also focused more on the argument of 
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intervention.  However, there were still threads of hope placed in the Vance- 
Owen plan, which has still not been accepted. 
Congressional involvement increased as the violence in Bosnia 
worsened throughout 1993 and 1994, which prompted the President to switch 
to a tougher stance. However, support for this strong rhetoric came in the 
form of "pin prick" NATO air strikes on Serbian targets, which did nothing to 
deter the Serbs from continuing their "ethnic cleansing " campaign. 
Public debate has tapered off drastically in the media. It has been 
replaced by new crises and threats in Haiti and the Persian Gulf. Domestic 
concerns over health care, the economy and political scandals have also taken 
center stage again in the American public debate.  However, behind the 
scenes, there are still Congressmen, Senators, and grassroots organizations 
who are dedicated to the humanitarian cause to save Bosnia, perhaps until 
the war is over—or the annihilation ceases. 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is but one example of tragedy 
unfolding across the globe. The public debate over U.S. interests in the worst 
European conflict since WWII, should be a warning to the world that the U.S. 
has refocused its interests toward humanitarian concerns when faced with 
conflicts considered to be regional or of "ethnic" origins. However, should 
also warn the U.S. government that foreign policy decisions cannot afford to 
wait for the public debate to develop. As described in this thesis, the public 
debate took two years to become fully developed. Once the debate evolved, 
the humanitarian aspect of the war emerged as the major concern among the 
actors. 
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The problems of the post-Cold War world are still emerging.  Public 
debate over foreign policy issues provides an excellent opportunity to address 
U.S. responsibilities in the new world.  These responsibilities do not 
necessarily involve military intervention in every corner of the world. 
However, guidelines must be established in order that the American 
government can make timely foreign policy decisions. 
Crisis prevention and preventive diplomacy are the tools which must 
be used to prepare the U.S. for such tragedies as the one in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.  Without an established foreign policy doctrine, future conflicts 
in the world may receive the same indecisive treatment by the U.S. as the 
former Yugoslavia experienced over the past three years. 
Crisis management requires vast amounts of financial and human 
resources.  The U.S. must weigh the costs of prolonged humanitarian 
intervention with the short-term and less costly approach of preventive 
diplomacy.  The failure of the Vance-Owen plan is attributed to its untimely 
arrival and limited scope.  Had the world community taken a more serious 
look at the events unfolding in the former Yugoslavia during 1990, perhaps a 
diplomatic course could have saved the tragedy which emerged. 
The chapter on genocide in the twentieth century has not been closed. 
It is up to the world community, with the U.S. as its leader, to decide how it 
wishes to be depicted by future generations. Genocide is not an uncommon 
occurrence in this century.  Armenia, Ukraine, Europe, Cambodia, and Bosnia 
are all soaked with the blood of innocent victims of senseless killings. 
The powerful impact of public debate over such serious issues should 
not be taken lightly.  If the U.S. government is to lead public opinion—rather 
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than the reverse-it must act with a timely and decisive fashion.  The U.S. has 
a responsibility, as the remaining superpower, to provide diplomatic~and if 
necessary, military-aid to the world community to prevent future tragedies 
throughout this new and complex world order. 
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